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RUSI VI

To promote national defence and security issues through discussion and engagement

Newsletter of the Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island

The Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island is a member of the Conference of Defence Associations. The CDA is the oldest and most influential advocacy group in Canada's defence community, consisting of associations from all parts of the country.

The CDA expresses its ideas and opinions with a view to influencing government security and defence policy. It is a non-partisan, independent, and non-profit organization.



Mark Your Calendar!

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THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE

RUSI-VI continues to provide, I hope, an interesting variety of speakers and topics. March's speaker is the well known and award-winning historian, Mark Zuehlke. Mark continues producing excellent military history through popularizing the story of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. His March topic, "The River Battles", is his latest and 20th book on the subject. Our April topic is extremely topical, given the recent Wetsuweten protests, with a presentation by Dr. Harry Swain, on the legacy of Oka. Dr. Swain was the Deputy Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs during the Oka crisis in 1990, which provides for a unique and timely perspective. Finally, our May presentation is on Epidemics and the Modern World by Dr. Mitch Hammond, another still evolving and topical issue that should be of interest to all.

We have moved away, in this newsletter, from a focus on the Chinese military, and instead will examine some issues of strategic interest. In that vein I point out the article entitled "When Does Terrorism Have A Strategic Effect." Terrorism always gets lots of media attention, even though its impact usually affects very few people. Terrorism can certainly terrorize, but when, like 9/11, has it risen to the level of affecting the achievement of the terrorist's goals?

I look forward to seeing you all at our upcoming luncheons!

Scott H. Usborne
President
Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island

Last Post

Peter Reader (LCdr - RCN), 28 Nov 2019

Laurence "Lou" FARRELL (LCdr RCN), 10 Jan 2020

Don Duke (Supt RCMP ret'd), 30 Jan 2020 – a RUSI-VI Life member since 1986

Peter D. Auger (LT(N) - RCN), 28 Feb 2020

New Members

Ed Jacobsen (VPD ret), Joined 22 Jan 2020

Bill Currie (Journalist), Joined 10 Feb 2020

Bernard Beck (RCMP ret), Joined 25 Nov 2019

Stephen Klimczuk-Maisson (HCol, 39 Svc Bn), Joined 30 Jan 2020

Canada Unprepared for Military Aggression Via Arctic, Say Defence Experts

Modernizing outdated North Warning System not funded as part of defence budget

BY RAHUL VAIDYANATH

February 5, 2020 Updated: February 5, 2020 *News Analysis*

No sooner had a gathering to discuss modernizing the defence of North America taken place than two Russian strategic bombers approached Canadian airspace from the Arctic. The menace underscores the message to the Canadian government and public that the country is at greater risk than it has been in decades.

North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) reported the Russian activity on Jan. 31, just two days after the Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI) hosted a major defence conference in Ottawa.

NORAD positively identified two Tu-160 Blackjack Russian Bombers entering the Canadian Air Defense Identification Zone on Friday, Jan. 31, 2020. The Russian aircraft remained in international airspace and did not enter United States or Canadian sovereign airspace. 1/3

— North American Aerospace Defense Command (@NORADCommand) January 31, 2020

“They [the Russians and Chinese] have the weapons systems and we are increasingly seeing the intent, so we haven’t caught up to that yet,” University of Calgary political science professor and conference panelist Rob Huebert said in an interview following the incident.

The Russian aircraft stayed in international airspace and didn’t enter U.S. or Canadian sovereign airspace, but it nevertheless highlighted the threat.

Huebert says what’s been holding Canada back is a decades-long multi-faceted problem of attitudes.

Canada is accustomed to playing the “away game” instead of the “home game,” meaning it prefers to face its threats as far away from its borders as possible. Thus the protection of the North American continent requires a change of mindset given the advanced capabilities of the Russians and Chinese.

It’s also naive on Canada’s part to think it can simply talk to Russia and China and get them to play nice.

“We have to be a lot more honest with Canadians,” Huebert said.

A government can favour certain initiatives, and the current one has shown it can generate broad public buy-in for its environmental initiatives. But even if the public isn’t clamouring for better military capabilities—as seen in the lack of interest the topic garnered during the election run-up—experts say the government can no longer ignore the military threat from Russia and China.

“What this government has shown no willingness to deal with is a much more comprehensive understanding of security that encapsulates both environmental security and military security,” Huebert said.

For example, the Liberals didn’t put forth their Arctic policy until a day before the election was called.

Canadian governments have put a lower priority on defence spending for decades, and that has left a consistent drop in capability compared to potential rivals. A case in point is that Canada opted in 2005 to not be a part of the U.S. ballistic missile defence program.

Contrast that attitude with the Russians or the Chinese and their imperialist goals.



42 Radar Squadron deploys its mobile installations during Exercise Amalgam Dart 15-2, a program for training Canadian and American military personnel in aerospace detection and defence, in Resolute Bay, Nunavut, on May 27, 2015. (Corporal Patrick Drouin, 4 Wing Imaging)

Russia wants to destroy us and China wants to own us, said John Sanford of the U.S.’s National Maritime Intelligence Integration Office, at the CGAI forum.

A power play is shaping up between the United States, China, and Russia, and the Arctic is the epicentre of the military conflict. That makes it Canada’s business, according to defence experts.

“People have to recognize there is a real threat,” said conference opening speaker Commodore Jamie Clarke, NORAD’s deputy director of strategy. “We are defending our entire way of life.” At risk is Canada’s economy and infrastructure, not to mention that of the United States.

At the heart of the matter is an outdated detection and deterrence system with no comprehensive replacement in the works.

Armor Units Outperform Airborne, Air Force and Navy in Deterring Aggression Overseas, Report Says

By JOHN VANDIVER | STARS AND STRIPES Published: February 6, 2020

STUTTGART, Germany — Ground troops based overseas with tanks and artillery are better at preventing conflict than their light infantry counterparts, a study said after examining more than 70 years of military deployments to determine what best deters adversaries.

In its report — “Understanding the Deterrent Impact of U.S. Overseas Deployments”— the research group Rand Corp. also found that when the military surges forces toward a flashpoint, it’s rare for fighting to break out.

“Despite these risks, the historical record suggests that very few crises escalate when the United States deploys forces to the crisis region ... These effects are particularly strong for ground forces, where no crises have escalated to major confrontation or war, and for air forces, where only one crisis has escalated,” the report said.

The clearest evidence for achieving deterrence was connected to “heavy ground forces,” which included armored units and those with air defense capabilities.

“The effects of these two types of forces were almost consistently positive, strongly statistically significant, and robust to multiple model specifications,” the report said.

There was less evidence to show that mobile, rotational forces deter as effectively. A possible reason is they “represent a lesser degree of high-level or long-term U.S. commitment or possibly because measuring their effects is more difficult,” the report said.

Light ground forces, which include airborne and special operations units stationed inside the borders of the ally or partner to be defended, could be counterproductive to deterrence, Rand said.

Those units were “associated with an increased likelihood of militarized disputes, including those of both lower and higher intensity, though not including war,” the report said.

Rand said more analysis is needed to understand why that could be the case, but one possibility is that light forces represent “a more rapidly deployable capability that provokes U.S. adversaries without representing sufficient capabilities to deter.”

The analysis also showed “little, if any, evidence for the deterrent impact of air and naval forces,” the report said.

“Because air and naval forces can be relatively easily redeployed between theaters, their presence represents a weaker signal of commitment,” Rand said. “Similarly, ground forces’ vulnerability when stationed overseas also represents a strong signal of resolve.”

The Rand report comes as the Pentagon is reviewing whether commands overseas are resourced to deal with the military’s top priority of countering China and Russia, even as thousands of troops remain on alert in the Middle East amid tensions with Iran.

For decades, the value of basing large numbers of troops overseas has been a source of fierce debate among security analysts, policymakers and some lawmakers, who have questioned the costs of maintaining big bases abroad.

In military circles, the discussion centers on whether it's better to rely on a rotational model that moves large numbers of U.S.-based troops back and forth overseas, or to instead support permanent bases.

Other analysts contend that long-range strike capabilities are enough to deter aggressors.

Comment from RUSI NS in Dispatches 14/02/20. - This article should be of interest to those in and studying Canadian ground forces, what with the debate from time-to-time as to what constitutes a balanced Army, that is, what light forces and what heavy forces (armour, heavy artillery, major air defence systems).

"The clearest evidence for achieving deterrence was connected to 'heavy ground forces'..." RAND appears to conclude 'go early' and 'go heavy.'

"The analysis also showed 'little, if any, evidence for the deterrent impact of air and naval forces'..." And RAND appears to conclude that 'boots on the ground' is the best deterrence.

So, what should it mean for the Canadian Armed Forces? How should the Forces be balanced between ground, air and sea forces, and within the ground forces? Of course, major factors to answering such questions are what the Canadian public expects out of its military, and what the Canadian government wants to fund and demand of the Forces.

Canadian Military Off-Target in Its Strategies To Recruit More Women

Marni Soupcoff 2020-02-11



© Corporal Ryan Moulton/Canadian Combat Forces Camera

Canadian Master Cpl. Elizabeth Inman mentors members of the Jordanian Armed Forces Quick Reaction Force Female Engagement Team during an exercise in Jordan on Sept. 2, 2019

Editor's note: The opinions in this article are the author's, as published by our content partner, and do not necessarily represent the views of MSN or Microsoft.

The goal of having women fill 25 per cent of the Canadian military's ranks by 2026 has left the Canadian Armed Forces with the same sticky question as many other employers: how to achieve greater diversity without compromising anyone's dignity or effectiveness, including their own.

The military could actively discriminate in favour of female applicants when judging relevant qualifications; or they could eliminate all irrelevant discriminatory barriers that could make the military less attractive to women, then let the numbers shake out as they may.

The latter is the better alternative.

As George Bernard Shaw said, "The domestic career is no more natural to all women than the military career is natural to all men."

Ideally, Canadian military officers would seek to recruit all people for whom the military career is indeed natural, and no people for whom it is not — regardless of gender.

Unfortunately, the proposals of the Canadian Armed Forces suggest that is not how they plan to go about it.

Strategy documents obtained by the National Post through access to information law requests show that a Canadian Armed Forces "Tiger Team" formed to strategize about increasing female recruitment recommended making the skirts issued to female soldiers shorter and slimmer — and updating their dress shoes.

That's not an especially flattering portrayal of female values, reminding me of comedian Elayne Boosler's quip about her belief that females are capable of engaging in deadly combat: "All the general has to do is walk over to the women and say, 'You see the enemy over there? They say you look fat in those uniforms.' "



Mike Hensen/Postmedia News Cpl. Hope Mosco prepares her vehicle for a large urban exercise at Wolseley Barracks in London, Ont., on April 26, 2019.

But at least the suggested sartorial modifications aren't likely to affect national defence. The same is not true for the Tiger Team's recommendation that military commanders be flexible in deciding which personnel are sent on deployment, especially in cases where there are difficulties getting childcare.

If the military is to protect Canadians, it must be able to deploy the soldiers best suited for the assignment, not those with the best babysitting networks.

Sure, the Canadian Armed Forces' research may show that 74 per cent of millennials want a workplace with flexible employment arrangements, but that doesn't mean that the military must or should become that workplace. Some jobs are by their nature more rigid in their hours and requirements. Defending the entire country is one of those jobs. It would be absurd to try to make soldiering more like being a part-time social media co-ordinator just to try to achieve a more diverse force.

The Tiger Team is said to have proposed an advertisement showing a female soldier removing her helmet at day's end, while "male and female co-workers gather and agree to having a campfire at a sandy beach," later roasting marshmallows and relaxing together.

The Tiger Team might be right that this sort of video would entice more women to join up — though they may be overestimating the female appetite for after-work gatherings that resemble summer camp singalongs — but is this really what recruits would find once they became members of the military?

If so, then maybe this helps explain why Canadians pay so little attention to their Armed Forces. (It's hard to get worked up about defence spending and replacement of equipment if you think your soldiers are mostly just holding chummy cookouts.) If not, then how long will these recruits stick around after they realize they have been sold a bill of goods by the Tiger Team's commercials?



Canadian reserve soldiers from 33 Field Ambulance participate in a simulated casualty scenario at the 5th Canadian Division Support Base (5 CDSB) Gagetown training area in New Brunswick on Aug. 23, 2017.

Women currently make up 15.9 per cent of the Canadian Armed Forces. That percentage may not be as great as the percentage of Canadian women out there who would want and excel at a military career.

But then again, maybe it is. As of 2014, women made up approximately 14 per cent of the active duty army in the United States as well, and as of 2013, women were matriculating into the West Point military academy at a rate of 16 per cent to 17 per cent.

It is possible that North Americans self-sort by gender into military positions at about this rate, which would make the Canadian military's goal of having a quarter of its force be female one that will take changing what it means to serve in order to achieve.

That's fine — indeed, with respect to changing some aspects of life in the Armed Forces, such as reducing sexual harassment, that's great — but only so far as these changes don't compromise our military's mission.

Our soldiers need not be a perfect reflection of the entire community; they need only be a perfect reflection of the entire community of effective soldiers.

And if that means they're wearing shorter skirts, then so be it.

How the EU can survive Brexit

There are tensions between Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel – but unless France and Germany can work together the bloc will fragment

BY CHARLES GRANT- *Director of the Centre for European Reform*

<https://www.newstatesman.com/world/europe/2020/02/how-eu-can-survive-brexit>

Britain's departure from the European Union ends an arduous two years and ten months since 29 March 2017, when Theresa May's government invoked Article 50 to give notice that it would withdraw. During that period Brexit has consumed time, energy and political capital in Brussels and other major European cities. Further negotiations with London will stretch on for years to come. But with Britain gone, European minds are turning to the other challenges facing the union.

Within Europe, the refugee and euro crises, though less acute in 2019 than in previous years, still fester, and have the potential to poison relations among the member states. The continent's economy needs to adapt to rapid technological change while finding ways of drastically curbing carbon emissions and overcoming worsening regional inequalities. Some of the EU's own governments play fast and loose with the rule of law – most egregiously in the case of Viktor Orbán in Hungary.

The wider world is also becoming more demanding. The EU is surrounded by strongman leaders who spurn its liberal internationalist values and disregard its preference for a rules-based order: Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The first two would happily watch the EU disintegrate. The EU also has to contend with the growing geopolitical and economic power of

China, whose autocratic leader, Xi Jinping, professes respect for global trading rules but shares few European values.

The EU needs to develop a steely resilience. Part of this is a question of policy: it needs to create the conditions in which economies can innovate and grow, and be firmer with the governments of member states that do not respect the rule of law. It also needs to generate the political will to act as one on the defining geopolitical challenges of the age.

The EU institutions often propose sensible policies and Ursula von der Leyen, the new European Commission president, has made an ambitious start, saying that she wants to run a more “geopolitical” commission. However, the key member states are unwilling to let EU institutions lead continental responses to the most pressing issues.

The European Commission enjoyed a golden age in the time of Jacques Delors, who was president between 1985 and 1995. But the political climate is now more favourable to “inter-governmentalism”, whereby national capitals make big decisions rather than letting Brussels take charge.

Throughout the EU’s history, France and Germany have provided backbone and stability. There were periods of great amitié, during the leaderships of Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer (who coincided from 1959 to 1963), Georges Pompidou and Willy Brandt (1969-1974), Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and Helmut Schmidt (1974-1981), François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl (1982-1995), and Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schröder (1998-2005).

When the Paris-Berlin tandem succeeds, the formula has tended to be the same: because France and Germany have such divergent interests, are governed so differently and disagree on so many issues, they have known that if they can find a common approach it is likely to work, not only for them but for the EU. Traditionally, the two continue negotiating until they reach a compromise.

The Maastricht Treaty – negotiated in 1991 – was in some respects the fruit of this formula. Mitterrand persuaded Kohl to accept economic and monetary union (EMU). Kohl made Mitterrand sign up to EMU on German terms, with an independent central bank, and also accept the ill-defined concept of political union. One element of this delicate compromise was France acquiescing in German reunification in 1990.

But over the past 15 years the Franco-German tandem has become less steady and, in some ways, less influential following the EU enlargements that took place between 2004 and 2013, which brought in the central and east European countries and the Baltic states. There was also a problem of imbalance. With reunification in 1990 Germany became the much larger partner. So long as the French economy performed relatively well, the disparity between the countries was not too serious, but since 2005, and particularly since the euro crisis from 2010 on, Germany’s economy has powered ahead. During that time Angela Merkel became Europe’s pre-eminent leader, with her French counterparts either inconsistent (Nicolas Sarkozy) or relatively passive (François Hollande).

In an increasingly lopsided relationship, German leaders started to lose respect for the French. The election of Macron to the French presidency in 2017 promised to rectify these imbalances. Yet his strategy of winning over the Germans by reforming the French economy has had mixed results.

The French economy is doing better thanks to Macron's reforms and Germany's slowdown – France has recently had faster economic growth than Germany – but that has not led to increased German engagement on matters such as eurozone reform.

Differences of both substance and style have contributed to the wobbles made by the tandem as the EU enters a post-Britain era. On substance, Germany is broadly happy with the way the EU and the eurozone work and sees the risk rather than the opportunity of substantial reform. The euro has been good for the German economy and its export industries, keeping inflation low and limiting Germany's obligations to support poorly performing southern European economies, such as Greece.

However, the French in general and Macron in particular consider such views complacent. They think the EU has never faced greater challenges and that it risks being squeezed between the US and China as they start to dominate the 21st century. In terms of style, Macron is a relatively new president whereas Merkel is coming towards the end of her long chancellorship. The French complain about Merkel's lack of vision and her habit of acting ponderously when faced with decisions. Paris considers the German government weak, introspective and dysfunctional. The French point, for example, to the recent ill-thought-through proposal by the German defence minister for a safe zone in northern Syria – on which neither they nor the German foreign ministry were consulted.

The Germans dislike Macron's penchant for bold, dramatic interventions, thinking them grandiose but lacking in detail. In the final phase of her chancellorship, Merkel sees her historical legacy as being a leader who kept Europe together during a crisis-bound period. She worries that Macron's bold but potentially divisive proposals – a eurozone budget, a multi-tier EU in which different member states integrate at different speeds, or further defence cooperation – undermine unity.

Yet all is not lost. France and Germany still work well together in many areas. They have more-or-less agreed on the EU's responses on migration and refugees, on climate and Europe's Green New Deal, on appointments to the key EU jobs (such as the presidencies of the Commission and the European Central Bank), on handling the Ukraine crisis through talks with the Ukrainian and Russian presidents, and on Brexit.

In some areas where they have previously clashed, there are signs of at least partial convergence. Germans are starting to share French concerns about China's strategic intentions and the need for more interventionist industrial policies. Meanwhile in January 2019 France and Germany signed the Treaty of Aachen, which commits the two countries to further cooperation on a range of issues from security to climate change. Merkel and Macron also held a joint summit with China's Xi Jinping in Paris in March last year. There are glimpses of hope in an otherwise gloomy picture.

Brexit makes Franco-German cooperation even more necessary – but also, in some ways, more difficult. The UK has acted as a kind of safety valve for the Franco-German relationship. When France got fed up with Germany on security issues, it could go and flirt with the UK. When Germany found France's reticence towards free trade and EU enlargement a pain, it could talk to the British. Now each has little alternative to the other.

Brexit also makes other member states more wary and resentful of Franco-German leadership. That in turn makes it harder for France and Germany to lead the EU, even when they agree. The European Commission will play a leading role in negotiating the future trade relationship between Britain and the EU, alongside France and Germany. But on the question of how to moderate the harmful geopolitical consequences of Brexit, Merkel and Macron will be pre-eminent, since they – unlike many other EU leaders – are accustomed to thinking about the bigger geopolitical picture. They understand why both Putin and Trump are so delighted by the disruption to European unity caused by Brexit.

The good news for those who hope for a close EU-UK security partnership is that Berlin and Paris think that the EU should create bespoke structures that keep the British involved in mutually relevant discussions – albeit ones that, on justice and home affairs, will require the UK to accept a strong role for the European Court of Justice. There is a fair chance that Boris Johnson's government will ultimately agree to a moderately close security relationship, because of the potential benefits for the UK; few Brexiteers voted to leave the EU because they disliked the common foreign and security policy. But there is a risk that if the talks on the future trading relationship break down, the atmosphere will be so acrimonious that Britain's leaders will spurn close security ties.

In several areas of security policy, officials may invent procedures that allow the British a voice in EU councils, though not a vote. However, senior figures I spoke with in both Paris and Berlin think that an additional format needs to be created at a high level, some new international institution independent of the EU.

Macron and Merkel have both spoken of a European Security Council (ESC). From a French perspective, one perceived advantage of such an institution could be to involve the UK in discussions on the big issues facing Europe, such as Russia, China or the Middle East, and to help prevent it sliding further towards the US. In Berlin, some politicians have called for an ESC that would include Britain. But others say they would prefer to build on the existing informal "EU3" meetings of Britain, France and Germany. They argue a more formal ESC could rival or damage the EU's institutions and irritate excluded member states.

Elsewhere, the biggest rift between France and Germany remains eurozone governance. Macron believes that in the long run a substantial eurozone budget is needed to provide support for members that face difficulties, as Greece and others did from 2010.

Over the past couple of years Macron's plan for a eurozone budget has been practically killed off by the Germans and their allies in the Dutch-led modern Hanseatic League – a group of northern, free-trading states who have stepped into part of the gap left by Britain. Without radical reform, argues Paris, the eurozone may not survive the next crisis.

But Merkel's government regards such talk as alarmist. Senior figures in Berlin said they would take French ideas more seriously if France could get its own borrowing under control, instead of increasing its public debt and breaching EU budget rules. Despite some signs of a debate in Germany on loosening certain fiscal regulations (such as the infamous "debt brake" limiting new borrowing), Merkel's Christian Democratic Union remains strongly opposed to radical reform and German public opinion remains firm in its opposition to establishing some sort of redistributive transfer union within the eurozone.

The stars are not wanted now: the UK's flag is removed from the Council of the European Union in Brussels, 31 January

But there are major tensions in at least four other crucial areas of EU policy. The first is the EU-US trade war. Trump has slapped steel and aluminium tariffs on imports from the EU. Macron believes that the best way to reverse the tariffs is to stand firm against him. German leaders, however, are fearful that Trump may enact his threat to put tariffs on European car exports, and would willingly seek a compromise. Thus Germany is keen to move ahead with an EU-US trade deal, possibly including agriculture. But that would be anathema to France and its farmers.

There are similar tensions over France's enthusiasm for taxing America's tech giants (Facebook, Google, Amazon and the rest), with Berlin much warier of upsetting Washington on digital taxes.

A second set of disagreements concerns EU enlargement. In November 2019 France vetoed the start of EU accession talks with North Macedonia and Albania. Seen from Berlin, which considers the Balkans strategically important, this was all about Macron's fear of Marine Le Pen exploiting the unpopularity of EU enlargement during the next presidential election. But the French argued – as they have often done over the past 30 years – that too much enlargement weakens the EU's cohesion and institutions. They will agree to opening accession talks only if the EU reforms its enlargement process – a demand to which Germany, other member states and the commission may well grudgingly accede.

France's new policy towards Russia also frustrates Germany. In a speech to French diplomats in August 2019, Macron said that he wanted to bring Russia in from the cold to help tackle international problems such as Syria and Islamist terrorism, and to prevent it from falling irreversibly into China's orbit.

Germany was annoyed with Macron for acting unilaterally. One senior foreign policy official in Berlin told me that he learned about the French initiative from Finnish officials – who had themselves heard about it from the Russians. As far as Germany is concerned, Russia can only begin ending its isolation by helping to broker peace in Ukraine and showing respect for international law.

In defence, the fourth area of disagreement, France and Germany start with diametrically opposed perspectives but sometimes end up working together. France, like the UK, has a strategic culture that is relaxed about deploying force outside Europe. German views on the use of force, however, are constrained by history. Thus when the EU's role in defence is discussed, Germany often favours tinkering with existing institutions or creating new procedures. It likes to support initiatives that all or nearly all member states will join, such as the “permanent structured cooperation” or PESCO, a grouping of countries that allows members to pursue defence projects together.

France, on the other hand, favours schemes that could facilitate Europeans acting militarily with real force – such as the 14-country European Intervention Initiative, an idea of Macron's that aims to foster a common strategic culture (and which includes the UK). When Macron said in November 2019 that Nato was “brain-dead”, and that he was unsure whether its members would automatically defend each other, as the alliance's Article 5 required them to do, he caused consternation in Berlin.

As it enters a new phase of its history the EU can achieve very little unless France and Germany work together. Despite the angst that has crept into the relationship, each generation of leaders in Paris and Berlin learns this truth.

What, then, to do? Macron needs to become a better diplomat. He would stand a greater chance of implementing his ideas if he found the time to consult and convince Germany and others before launching them. He should not undermine Nato's credibility by publicly questioning the commitment to mutual self-defence contained in Article 5. Nor should he make overtures to Russia unless it shows greater respect for international law. As for enlargement, Macron should be willing to compromise on what he can get in return for lifting his veto on further accession talks.

But Germany needs to be less complacent about some of the threats to the EU and its currency. A continuation of the present policies could lead to them being weakened, or worse. It should accept that in the eurozone the price of leadership and success is some degree of responsibility for the welfare of less prosperous members.

In return it is entitled to expect EU mechanisms that compel "problem" countries to manage their economies better. As for European security, Berlin should be willing to contribute more, rather than take a free ride from others.

Much will depend on the leadership of France and Germany. Macron and Merkel are still capable of working together effectively, and she is likely to remain in office well into 2021. Potentially, their skill-sets can be very complementary: he brings vision, bold ideas and youthful energy; she offers calm, experience and a spirit of compromise. Brexit has given the European project a reality check. It's time for the Big Two to resolve their differences and raise their game.

A Plea to Save The Last Nuclear Arms Treaty

Extending the New Start agreement would help halt the spread of nuclear weapons

Published: February 10, 2020 13:17

Madeleine Albright and Igor Ivanov, New York Times

The relationship between Russia and the United States has been mired in crisis for much of the past decade. Communication once considered routine has been cut off, deepening mistrust and making it more difficult to reduce tensions and avoid miscalculation. The current state of affairs does not serve the strategic interests of either country, and it puts global security at risk because Russia and the United States are the only countries that possess enough nuclear weapons to destroy each other — and all of humanity.

Rebuilding mutual confidence and putting United States-Russian relations on a safer track will be a challenging long-term endeavour, given the political climates in Washington and Moscow. But the

two countries have a chance to head off even more instability by extending the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (Start), which expires in one year, on February 5. While 12 months may seem like a lot of time, in diplomatic terms and in the present environment, the clock is ticking fast.

The United States and Russia can avoid a senseless and dangerous return to nuclear brinkmanship if they act soon. There is no reason to wait, and extending the treaty, known as New Start, is the place to begin.

With the unfortunate dissolution of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty last year, New Start is the only agreement still in place that limits the size of American and Russian nuclear forces. It also provides vital verification and transparency measures, including onsite inspections, that have helped foster strategic stability. The treaty allows for a five-year extension if the leaders of both countries agree. President Vladimir Putin and President Donald Trump should seize this opportunity.

Our countries survived the nuclear dangers of the Cold War through a combination of skilled diplomacy, political leadership and good fortune. The fall of the Berlin Wall did not eliminate those dangers, but the years that followed saw continued progress on arms control, a sharp drop in nuclear peril and a reduced reliance on military means for addressing potential conflicts.

Today, in contrast, geopolitical tensions are rising and the major powers are placing a renewed emphasis on the role of nuclear weapons in their military strategies. Experts are suddenly talking less about the means for deterring nuclear conflict than about developing weapons that could be used for offensive purposes.

The folly of nuclear war:

Some have even embraced the folly that a nuclear war can be won.

Late last year, we met in Vienna with other former foreign ministers from more than a dozen countries, as part of the Aspen Ministers Forum, to review the global security landscape and examine these trends in depth. We emerged from these consultations deeply troubled by the possible worldwide consequences of an accelerating global arms race, the increased risk of military incidents and the degradation of arms reduction and non-proliferation agreements. We believe that the world needs to move in a new, less hazardous direction.

As a result of that meeting, we and 24 other former foreign ministers are now issuing a statement calling upon leaders of all countries to counter the uncertainties posed by nuclear weapons more urgently. The means to address these dangers are at our disposal, but they can be carried out only through wise leadership. During the Cold War, the world proved that well constructed, balanced and faithfully implemented treaties, political commitments and norms of behaviour can effectively reduce tensions and the likelihood of conflict.

The dangers of miscalculation

This spring, 190 nations will gather in New York on the 50th anniversary of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to review current nuclear risks and proliferation challenges. Extending New Start would send a signal to the rest of the world as other countries consider their responsibilities to help halt the spread of nuclear weapons. It could also lay the foundation for increased international cooperation in the next decade.

The recent escalation of attacks between the United States and Iran demonstrated how quickly the lack of guardrails can move us to the brink of war. Amid the erosion of multilateral agreements and diplomatic channels, we came close to calamity. The dangers of miscalculation are too grave for leaders to resort to ambiguous communication, threats and military action.

In the years ahead, the security landscape will be made only more challenging by emerging technologies and their interplay with conventional and nuclear capabilities. So it will be crucial to create a revitalised spirit of diplomacy based on a shared understanding of the dangers, and ways to mitigate potential sources of harm. As former foreign ministers, we pledge to continue speaking out on this issue and do our part in this effort.

— Madeleine Albright was the US secretary of state from 1997 to 2001. Igor Ivanov was the Russian foreign minister from 1998 to 2004.

When Does Terrorism Have a Strategic Effect?

DANIEL BYMAN

Nov 26, 2019

One of the worst terrorist attacks in the post-9/11 era killed no one. When Al Qaeda in Iraq bombed the Askari shrine in Samarra in 2006, only the mosque itself was damaged. However, by striking at one of the most important Shiite shrines in the world, [it enraged Iraq's Shiite majority](#), inflaming sectarian tension and exacerbating that country's civil war. Tens of thousands of Iraqis would die in the resulting violence. In contrast, a far bloodier jihadist attack a decade later, and one closer to home for most Americans, had little long-term impact beyond the deaths of innocent people. In 2016, [Omar Mateen](#) shot 49 people at the Pulse night club in Orlando in the name of the Islamic State. This attack soon faded from the headlines, and U.S. foreign policy did not change.

Not all terrorism is created equal. Some attacks are merely blips on the terrorism radar screen, grabbing headlines for a few days before life resumes as before. Other attacks, however, shake the world. The strategic effects of such an attack go far beyond whether it helps a terrorist group win, and they can be divided into two areas. First, terrorism can affect conflict and international politics, shaping foreign policy, sparking international and civil wars, and preventing peace negotiations. Second, terrorism can undermine democracy by decreasing faith in public institutions. The strategic success of terrorism often depends as much on the government response as it does the terrorist attack itself: too little or too much counterterrorism can do the terrorists' jobs for them.

Conflict and International Politics

Understandably, after an attack, observers quickly focus on the death toll to determine how serious it was. Body count matters, but it is not everything. The 9/11 strikes, of course, were [off the chart in terms of lethality](#) and thus impossible to ignore. The vast majority of attacks, however, are far less noticeable. The [University of Maryland reports](#) that last year saw almost 10,000 terrorist attacks, but few of these killed more than a handful of people and fewer still made the headlines. Even some high-body-count attacks fail to lead to dramatic changes. When [Libyan agents bombed Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie](#),

[Scotland, in 1988](#), they killed 270 people. This stiffened anti-Libyan sentiment in the West, but this feeling was already strong. In fact, the [United States had already bombed Libya for its involvement in terrorism](#) in 1986. Similarly, Al Qaeda's 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania killed 224 people (most of whom were not U.S. citizens) and [led to new counterterrorism plans, resource shifts, and other changes](#) within the U.S. government. With post-9/11 hindsight, the 1998 changes seemed half-hearted. When the Islamic State bombed Paris in November 2015 and killed 130 people, [France and other European nations stepped up their military efforts in Syria](#), but they were already part of the anti-Islamic State coalition. Even France's efforts at home were simply an increase in an already-robust counterterrorism campaign. France emerged from the bombing more determined, but its policy did not shift in a fundamental way.

The 9/11 attacks are a rare but painful example of how terrorism can truly reshape foreign policy, creating new allies and new enemies. The United States not only went to war in Afghanistan to roust Al Qaeda and its Taliban sponsor — a war that continues to this day — but it also deployed military forces [around the world](#) to root out Al Qaeda affiliates and like-minded groups. In addition to such obvious efforts, the United States also focused far more attention on allies like [Egypt](#) and [Yemen](#) as well as [frenemies like Pakistan](#), which previously had been neglected. The rise of China and other important changes in the world order [received far less attention](#) as a result. Critics claim that beyond this neglect, counterterrorism has [distorted U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East](#) and [infringed on civil rights](#) at home.

Terrorism can even spark wars among the great powers and, in so doing, destroy entire political orders. [Serbia sponsored the Black Hand](#), a pan-Serb group that sought to unify, and in their eyes liberate, Bosnia and other areas with large Serb populations under Austro-Hungarian control. In 1914, the Black Hand assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand, plunging Europe into war. Ferdinand, ironically, was a [strong advocate for peace and federalism](#) proposals that enhanced the status of Slavs in the empire, and his assassination not only proved a pretext for Austria to invade, but also eliminated the leader of the peace camp. Serbia itself [lost almost half of its army](#) in the war to death, injury, or capture, while the war in total led to over [eight million military](#) and [hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths](#). In the ensuing conflagration, the Austro-Hungarian empire collapsed, Russia fell to revolution, and nations like Poland were reborn.

Less dramatically, but no less consequentially for those involved, terrorism can snowball into other forms of deadly violence, leading to broader insurgencies and rebellions. After the 2003 U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq, jihadists launched a series of terrorist attacks on UN, Shiite, and other targets in an attempt to exacerbate sectarian tension and isolate Iraq from international support. The death toll was not huge, but the violence, along with a general lack of governance, destroyed faith in the new Iraqi government and the U.S.-imposed system. Caught in the vacuum, the population turned to sectarian militias rather than the government for protection. By 2004, [terrorism had snowballed into an insurgency](#), and a year later, the country was suffering from a full-blown civil war with continued terrorist attacks like the Askari shrine bombing exacerbating the violence.

Just as terrorism can foster war, so too can it inhibit peace. Terrorists can play the role of [spoiler](#), using violence to disrupt negotiations. In 1995, a Jewish terrorist [assassinated Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin](#) because the terrorist opposed Rabin's efforts to make peace with the Palestinians. In the months that followed, Palestinian terrorists launched a bloody campaign with attacks on Israeli buses and outside a major shopping center. The campaign led Israelis to distrust the good intentions of Yasir Arafat, the Palestinian leader, seeing him as either complicit in the violence or powerless to stop it. In 1996, as terrorist attacks continued unabated, Israelis [elected a new Prime Minister](#), Benjamin Netanyahu, who was far more skeptical of peace talks. Talks continued for the rest of the decade, but the damage to Arafat's image lingered even after the violence ebbed.

Emphasizing such strategic effects differs from a more standard focus on whether terrorism is a successful set of tactics in the first place for the terrorist group. Scholars have pointed out that groups [often fail to achieve their goals](#), in part because attacking civilians makes government concessions less likely, and that [non-violent means](#) are often more effective. Counterterrorism, however, must counter the wide array of effects attacks can have beyond the chance of terrorist victory.

Effects on Democracy

The legacy of terrorist violence demonstrates yet another strategic effect: how terrorism can shape long-term public attitudes. In Israel, the violence of the Second Intifada, which began in 2000 and raged for several years before the violence fell dramatically after 2005, [soured Israelis on peace negotiations](#), convincing them that the Palestinians never truly wanted peace. This skepticism has continued even though Israel has now enjoyed more than a decade of low terrorism levels.

For many countries, the biggest problem with terrorism is that it can erode faith in institutions. If a government cannot protect its people, it is no government at all. When terrorism is directed at particular communities and the government response is weak or even complicit, the consequences can be enduring. During Reconstruction and in the Jim Crow era, local law enforcement often tolerated or joined in KKK or other white-supremacist violence designed to subjugate African Americans, contributing to lasting suspicion of the police as an impartial force. Despite [progress since then](#), African-Americans are more likely to [see the police as biased](#). Police shootings of unarmed blacks and other perceived abuses also lead to [greater mental health problems](#) among the African-American community. Not surprisingly, when violence does occur, the community is less likely to work with the police or otherwise turn to the government to solve their problems. Governments must recognize that minority communities that have suffered discrimination deserve additional protections because of the risk of the government losing legitimacy is often greater.

The strategic impact of terrorism depends heavily on the skill and reactions of the government fighting the terrorists. Terrorists seek to change government policies, and they often do so by pushing the government to overreact or to display weakness, thereby discrediting it or increasing support for the terrorist cause. It is difficult for political leaders not to respond as politicians, and President Trump's reactions, such as using the aftermath of an attack to criticize his political opponents, shows [how responses to terrorism can exacerbate social divisions](#) even more than attacks themselves.

History is not a tape to be rewound, but the failure to stop Jewish and Palestinian terrorists allowed peace to slip through the hands of negotiators just as the failure to police Iraq allowed small-scale violence to snowball into a disastrous civil war. Similarly, the U.S. government [paid too little attention to white supremacists](#) even after the threat became manifest. Governments, however, must walk a careful line, as too tough a response is also often a mistake. Dramatic policy shifts, such as going to war or changing allies, must not be done lightly, but the political realities often push leaders to respond first and think through the tradeoffs later. Such rash actions often do the terrorists' jobs for them, enabling them to gain sympathy for their cause and truly change the world when their actions would otherwise be consigned to oblivion.

Daniel Byman is a professor in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.

Canadian governments give Huawei millions in funding while debate rages over its 5G role

Tom Blackwell - National Post 2020-02-03

As it fights for the right to be part of Canada's future 5G wireless network, Huawei Technologies often cites the fact it has invested hundreds of millions of dollars in this country.

But government statistics show the largesse has flowed the other way, too, underlining the close relationship the Chinese tech giant has forged with at least one province and Ottawa.

Canadian governments have provided millions in funding to Huawei and academic researchers collaborating with it, most of the grants designed to enhance the company's 5G prowess, records indicate.

The support includes a [\\$16-million handout](#) from Ontario's former Liberal government to Huawei in 2016, augmenting money the company said it would spend on enhancing 5G research in the province.

- [Canada eyes U.K.'s decision to grant Huawei partial access to 5G network](#)
- [Huawei likely faces 5G ban in Canada, security experts say](#)
- [Growing number of Canadians oppose Huawei's 5G bid as China hardens foreign policy stance: poll](#)

A McGill University engineering professor is receiving \$740,000 from a federal funding agency over five years for cutting-edge work with the firm on next-generation wireless.

"Huawei Technologies Canada will benefit from this project through the development of technology and proof-of-concept demonstration platforms," notes the Natural Science and Engineering Research Council (NSERC) in its description of the project.

Funding bodies say the grants have helped create jobs and scientific know-how that benefits all Canadians. Indeed, jointly financing private-sector projects is a longstanding practice of most governments and common in university research.

"To build a strong economy and improve the lives of all Canadians, we need a research environment that is open and collaborative," said NSERC spokesman Martin Leroux.

But some critics opposed to Huawei taking part in Canada's fifth-generation wireless on national-security grounds say the funding makes little sense from a security perspective.

"We are using our money to enable them to have decades' further ability to turn around and threaten our own country and our own citizens," charged Ivy Li of the group Canadian Friends of Hong Kong. "That is actually a very, very bad deal."

Canadians widely encouraged Chinese investment until very recently, while Huawei itself provided employment when Ottawa-based Nortel Networks collapsed in 2009, noted Hugh Stephens, a distinguished fellow with the Asia Pacific Foundation.

"We have this research capability, we don't have that global champion any more," he said, referring to Nortel. "People are looking around for who are the willing investors, who's willing to come in here, who's willing to build on what we have. A lot of it is to keep the effort going."

The federal government is expected to announce its decision soon about whether to allow Huawei to supply equipment for 5G wireless networks, an upgrade that will make possible dramatic new applications of mobile-communications technology, integrating everything from driver-less cars to power plants.

The British government gave Huawei the green light to build part of its 5G network last week.

Critics warn there is a serious risk that Huawei will build “back doors” into the technology allowing China access to Canadian private information and critical infrastructure. The United States and Australia have already banned it from their next-generation systems.

Huawei has said such fears are baseless and rooted in the U.S. trade war with China, Ren Zhengfie, its founder, saying he would rather close down the company than have it used for spying or sabotage.

Meanwhile, the corporation has built a [major Canadian presence](#) in just a decade, investing \$600 million in various in-house research facilities and the work of university scientists.

The financial support it has received from government is less well known.

It includes a \$16-million grant announced by former premier Kathleen Wynne in 2016 to help create 250 new company research jobs centred around 5G development. The firm promised to chip in \$300 million. The funding agreement lasts until 2021, and the province has not committed any more money, said a spokesman for Ontario’s Economic Development Ministry.

The province had provided Huawei \$6.5 million in 2010 for another job-creation initiative, part of what Ontario called a strategic partnership.

From the same 2016-17 fiscal year to 2019-20, NSERC has provided 43 grants totalling \$6.9 million to university researchers working in partnership with Huawei, online government databases and figures provided by the council to the National Post indicate. Of those, at least 23 mention research on 5G or next-generation wireless networks.

The grants went to universities in Quebec, Ontario, Alberta and B.C., the descriptions often explaining how the corporate co-funder — sometimes described as a Canadian company — would benefit.

A University of Toronto project to reduce the power consumption of digital circuits, receiving \$429,000 from NSERC, could slash costs and deliver Huawei “enhanced competitiveness,” says an outline of the three-year grant.

Charles Burton, a former diplomat to China and professor at Brock University, in St. Catharines, Ont., said NSERC should assess such funding requests partly on national-security grounds, but that doesn’t seem to be happening.

“It appears pretty clear the collaboration of Canadians in the research is serving the interests of a foreign entity that has strong connections to a foreign government,” he said.

The Globe and Mail [reported last year](#), in fact, that NSERC indicated it specifically did not want to hear from people with “strong political opinions” when it called for input on the proposed Laval research chair.

But NSERC’s Leroux says the council works with universities and security agencies to manage the risks inherent in any kind of research partnership and defended the grants as good for the country and innovation here.

He said about 30 per cent of the council's funding goes to research done in collaboration with outside private and public-sector organizations.

Comment by Richard McNair (RUSI NS)

Foreign affairs, defence and security issues made little or no impact on the recent elections in Canada, yet, major events are occurring which will have major effects on the lives of Canadian citizens. The current impasse with China caused by Canada following the decision to arrest Meng Wanzhou for fraud at the request of the Americans. The Communist Chinese Party (CCP) took retaliatory actions against Canadian citizens such as the arrest and imprisonment and torture of Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig; the change from a prison sentence to a death penalty for Robert Schellenberg. Canada has also been hit with massive economic retaliation in canola, soybeans beef and pork products in line with the CCP concept of the 'Three Wars concept.' (Approved by the Central Military Commission in 2003 envisages attacking countries by means other than direct conflict.)

Chinese law requires all companies private and sovereign owned to act on behalf of the Communist Chinese Party when asked. There is no guarantee that any Chinese company won't follow the direction of the CCP. Huawei is no exception. Little has been said of the British decision which allows up to 35% of Huawei equipment to be used in a future 5G network in Britain. The US has asked the British Government to reconsider their decision. The US House has just recently introduced legislation that will cut off intelligence support to countries that use Huawei equipment.

Canada has not made any final decision on the use of Huawei equipment. Canada has some cyber-defence capability, but it is small in comparison to the British. There are major efforts underway to enlarge that capacity within the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) but it is too small and vastly over-tasked to provide the level of oversight necessary to ensure network security at least at this point.

Currently, in Canada, our Government has shown a distain for security issues. Huawei executives have had been found to be conducting espionage in Poland and the Czech Republic at was a major contractor in the building of the African Union Headquarters in Addis Ababa in Ethiopia. Classified documents were sent immediately to servers in China even before the intended recipients could read them. The British also found multiple problems and defects in Huawei equipment. It estimated that it would take 10 to 15 years to correct to British satisfaction.

The concern here is that the Canadian Government seems more interested in future business interest in China. Academia in certain areas is also the same such as we have a British Columbia University that allowed Chinese acoustic sensors to be laid only a short distance from the US Naval base at Bangor Washington. The information from these sensors was sent to Hainan Island, which is the home of China's nuclear submarine fleet. The Government has also allowed the sale of a Montreal electronics company that sold tactical radio components to China despite recommendations not to sell from Canada's own security establishment. Now we have the information that the Canadian Government is providing funding for a profitable company of an adversarial power. Our new foreign Minister is a businessman and our new Ambassador to China is also a businessman with Chinese business ties. The new Parliamentary Committee on China Canada Relations is apparently long overdue. It should give some clarity and transparency on Government actions on China which to date have been uninspiring and concerning.

Mark Your Calendar

11 March 2020

Topic: River Battles: Canada's Final Campaign in World War Two Italy

Speaker: Mark Zuehlke (author, books for sale)

The Canadians called it the Promised Land. In late September 1944, the Emilia-Romagna plain before I Canadian Corps stretched to the far horizon—a deceptively wide-open space where the tanks could run free. Throughout British Eighth Army, hopes ran high that once it entered the plain, the Germans could be driven from Italy. As soon as the advance began, however, the plain's true nature was revealed: the land was criss-crossed by rivers, canals and drainage ditches over which all bridges had been demolished.

With higher command urging haste, the Canadians entered a long and nightmarish series of battles to win crossings over each waterway, whose high banks provided the Germans with perfect defensive positions. Early fall rains caused rivers to spill their banks and transformed the countryside into the worst quagmire the soldiers had ever seen.

More than five months of battle followed, with weeks of hard fighting required to advance from one river to the next. Each month, conditions only worsened, and the casualty rates rose appallingly. As their comrades fell one by one, most soldiers sought merely to survive. Doing that much required every measure of stamina, courage and fighting skill they possessed.

The fifth and final Canadian Battle Series volume set in Italy, *The River Battles* tells the story of this campaign's last and hardest months. In riveting detail and with his trademark "you-are-there" style, Mark Zuehlke shines a light on this forgotten chapter of Canada's World War II experience.

8 April 2020

Topic: Oka: A Political Crisis and Its Legacy

Speaker: Dr. Harry Swain (Professor UVic, book for sale)

On July 11, 1990, tension between white and Mohawk people at *Oka*, just west of Montreal, took a violent turn. At issue was the town's plan to turn a piece of disputed land in the community of Kanasatake into a golf course. Media footage of rock-throwing white residents and armed, masked Mohawk Warriors facing police across barricades shocked Canadians and galvanized Aboriginal people from coast to coast. In August, Quebec Premier Robert Bourassa called for the Canadian army to step in.

Harry Swain was deputy minister of Indian Affairs throughout the 78-day standoff, and his recreation of events in his book is dramatic and opinionated. In *Oka*, Swain writes frankly about his own role and offers fascinating profiles of the high-level players on the government's side -- Quebec Native Affairs Minister John Ciaccia, federal Indian Affairs Minister Tom Siddon, Chief of the Defence Staff General John de Chastelain, Premier Robert Bourassa and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. Swain offers rare insight into the workings of government in a time of crisis, but he also traces what he calls the 200-year tail of history and shows how the Mohawk experience reflects the collision between European and Aboriginal cultures.

Twenty years on, health, social and economic indicators for Aboriginal Canadians are still shameful. The well-funded "Indian industry" is a national disgrace, Swain says, and the Indian Act is in urgent need of replacement. Identifying current flashpoints for Aboriginal land rights across the country, he argues that true reconciliation will not be possible until government commits to meaningful reform.

13 May 2020

Topic: Epidemics in Modern History

Speaker: Professor Mitch Hammond, University of Victoria

Although a few months off, this speaker will be able to place our current COVID 19 virus pandemic in the context of other epidemics in Modern History.

The views expressed by the authors of articles in this newsletter do not necessarily reflect the views of RUSI-VI.

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