Oral History and the Recollections of R.C.A.F. Bomber Crews

For History 394 (F01) (Dr. Cafferky)
An Essay By Matthew A. Chapman
4 January 2006

            No other event in human history has been so extensively documented, studied and written about than the Second World War, and as such, there will forever be further works which tell and re-tell its defining moments. What will eventually come to pass, and I regret to say that we are soon approaching this time, is that we will no longer be able to share conversations with those who experienced the realities of that war. The nuances that accompany speech and the gestures in conversations tell a story that runs parallel to the words. In this sense, no book can portray the emotion and passion of a personal recollection. The tone of speech along with the complexities of stuttering, pauses, volume and speed, all have meaning, and can be indicators of emotions and feelings attached to the events described. [1] Often the events which influenced these subtle gestures and nuances will only be known by the subconscious of the one recalling the experiences, but often they can be deciphered by an attentive listener. As such, a story will be lost when these conversations are over. This is where the collection of oral history becomes a compromise. Recording the stories and voices of veterans does not serve as a perfect means of documenting the events of the past, nor is it immune from the faults of other forms of recorded history. In this sense, if historians are looking for a direct encounter with the past, hoping to find the ultimate and singular truths of events gone by, they are chasing an illusion. [2]  What oral recordings do offer is the extraordinary value of giving a personality to the past, and adding an “authentic testimony of human life,” [3] to a field of study that is dominated by statistics, operational discussions and broad theories. By adding to the archive of oral history a wide range of opinions and points of view, it is therefore possible to expand the “horizon of historical research,” [4] past the limits of written sources. The following will attempt to demonstrate this by comparing oral interviews with secondary written sources that detail the events described by the veterans. To this end, the following focuses on the recollections, sixty plus years later, of three men who served in the Royal Canadian Air Force (R.C.A.F.) as aircrew in Bomber Command.

            Douglas Hudson was born in Winnipeg on 21 November 1921. When war was declared in Canada, he decided to join the navy. Through a twist of fate on his way to enlist, he happened upon an R.C.A.F. recruiting office. When he asked if they were looking for aircrew, the recruiter replied, “Sit down and sign this.” [5] When told he would most likely become a tail gunner, he was not thrilled with the idea and instead was able to use his musical talent and “good ear” to become a wireless operator. Mr. Hudson went on to fly thirty-one missions over Europe with 420 Squadron, 6^th Group R.C.A.F. [6]

            Born in 1921, Ross Irwin was already working for the DeHavilland aircraft company in Toronto when he joined the R.C.A.F. in 1940. After completing mechanic’s training and operational postings in Canada, Mr. Irwin was sent oversees to support the Royal Air Force (R.A.F.). While in England, he volunteered to become a flight engineer with Bomber Command. After completing the training for this position, he flew as a Canadian in R.A.F. 4 Group, where he received a Distinguished Flying Medal on his last operation. After the war, Mr. Irwin went on to serve in the Canadian Navy in Korea and Egypt. [7]

            James Baillie was an “old man” when he joined the R.C.A.F. in February 1941. At twenty-four, Mr. Baillie proved to the Air Force that he had what it took to become a pilot. After training, he was posted as a flight instructor in Canada, so that by the time he was sent oversees he had accumulated 1,346 hours of flight time in his logbook. Leaps and bounds above many who only had two or three hundred hours’ training, this experience served Mr. Baillie well as a Squadron Leader, and consequently as a Wing Commander after the war. [8]

            Lancaster, Halifax, Wellington, Whitley, and Sterling are just a few names of the aircraft that served in the ranks of the R.A.F. and R.C.A.F. in the bomber offensive against Germany during World War Two. Perhaps, out of all these names only a few are well known to the public today. If only one is known, it is surely the Lancaster. In the historical record there is no lack of praise given to this great machine, and its performance as a heavy bomber is legendary. A similar four-engine aircraft that is not as well known today is the bomber that was flown by Mr. Hudson, Mr. Irwin and Mr. Baillie. Along with being the workhorse of R.C.A.F. 6 Group, [9] the Handley Page Halifax was the second most heavily deployed aircraft of British Bomber Command with 6,178 built. [10] In the historical record, the Halifax has had the misfortune of flying in the Lancaster’s shadow. However, when one talks to the crews that manned these aircraft, a much different picture emerges of the bomber than is often portrayed in the secondary sources and modern popular knowledge. As was so clearly pointed out in the writings about the aircraft, in its early Mk.II and Mk.V versions (See Appendix, Photograph A), it had issues of being underpowered and slower than the Lancaster, as well as having a smaller bomb load than its more famous cousin. [11] It was also prone in its early versions to entering stalls and spins quite rapidly and unexpectedly due to a condition known as rudder overbalance. [12] It is important to realize however, that most of the negative judgments made about the Halifax were based on facts that relate to its early variants. Most, if not all aircraft in World War Two had histories of aerodynamic quirks, operational weaknesses and engineering defects. This includes the Lancaster in its many different versions. With the introduction of the Halifax Mk. III’s and VII’s (See Appendix, Photograph B), most, if not all of the issues with the aircraft were solved and it performed most admirably throughout the rest of the war. It seems therefore that a bad reputation was given to the Halifax early on that could never be totally shaken. For the men who flew them, this has remained a source of frustration. Mr. Irwin, a mechanic before the war, was very pleased even with the early version of the Halifax, and noted that it had some decided advantages over the Lancaster. It was relatively easy, Mr. Irwin recalled, to evacuate a Halifax in a hurry, while the “Lancasters were a helluva mess to get out of.” [13] In a world were seconds counted as a disabled aircraft plunged to its fate, such a consideration was perhaps more important to a crew than most other factors. The Halifax also had a reputation, that was shared by some of the best aircraft of the war, of being able to take massive amounts of damage and still fly. This was directly experienced by Mr. Irwin on his last raid as he recalls landing back in England after having the tail shot up, the port flap and aileron badly damaged, the pilot’s instrument panel shot out, two engines rendered inoperable, and damage to most of the fuselage as a result of 20mm cannon shells from a German night fighter. [14] The Halifax Mk. III and resulting variants were indeed vastly superior machines than the previous models. With Hercules radial engines replacing the underpowered Merlins, the power and speed of the new Halifax at low altitudes were in fact superior to most of the early Lancasters. A modification to the tail section also eliminated the problems associated with rudder overbalance. The impression given in the historical record that later versions of the Halifax were only, “somewhat improved,” [15] from its early versions is quite obviously an understatement. The modifications produced such beneficial results that some squadrons (including No. 426 which Mr. Baillie would join later on) converted from the earlier Lancasters to the new Halifaxes. [16] Mr. Baillie’s memories of the Halifax from a pilot’s perspective are nothing short of glowing. [17] His home study is today proudly adorned with pictures, books and sculptures of the great plane. Mr. Hudson has similar memories of the Halifax. As an aircraft which saw him through an incredible thirty one missions, it is not hard to realize why he thinks so highly of this underrated bomber. [18]

            The life of an airman in Bomber Command was unique amongst the services of World War Two. Operations took place usually at night, requiring a reverse of standard sleeping patterns during operations. Physical fatigue was a major problem for many aircrews that were posted for operations on consecutive nights. Perhaps the most strenuous part of this pattern was the mental fatigue and stress associated with the intense experience of operating in brutally hostile environments night after night. This challenge was particularly acute for pilots who, unlike the U.S. Air Force, operated without the aid of a co-pilot, and found autopilots to be temperamental at best. [19] Little attention is paid to this human factor in the history of the R.C.A.F. This may be because it is hard to imagine exactly how exhausting missions were for aircrew. It is only though interviewing the men that went through these experiences that we are able to come to grips with this fact. Douglas Hudson recalls that after two consecutive missions on the nights of 29-30 December 1944, he went to bed for two days, only getting up once to eat some Christmas cake. [20] Completely exhausted both mentally and physically he recalls:

It was not uncommon for aircrews to go on more than three or four missions consecutively. Mr. Baillie recalls from his logbook completing six in just fifteen days. [22] Mr. Irwin recalls flying seventeen and a half hours in a twenty six hour period. [23] An understanding of the stress and fatigue associated from the frequency of operations can help one better understand the loss rates due to accidents. As Mr. Hudson continued, “You get careless and overtired, beat and stressed out.” The results of this fatigue were particularly dangerous during the last part of a mission. The weather in England, renowned for fog and poor visibility, often times added to the troubles of already mentally and physically exhausted aircrew when landing. In one particular mission to Berlin on 16 December 1942, twenty nine aircraft crashed while attempting to land in fog at English bases. The number of aircraft lost to the enemy on the same raid was only twenty five. [24] Mr. Baillie himself fell into a similar circumstance on one particular night. After returning from a mission to Chemnitz, unexpected bad weather had moved over England. Given the fact that his Halifax was down to critical fuel levels, he had no alternative but to attempt to let down through the cloud layer. At a time before precision and even non-precision approach technologies, Mr. Baillie had no choice but to use what he had. By performing a novel method of descending through cloud by using the rudimentary navigational aid Gee, in what was called a Gee Line, he and his Navigator managed to miraculously break out of cloud at a mere six hundred feet above sea level with the aerodrome directly ahead of them. Had he not broken out at that precise location and time, the aircraft would have run out of fuel before being able to try another approach. [25] Given the extreme concentration and skill required to accomplish this delicate maneuver even in an undamaged aircraft, it is not unlikely many accidents during landing in bad weather were partly the result of exhausted crews who could muster little energy in such moments of extreme pressure.

Out of the 5,700 airmen who manned the bombers of Canadian No. 6 Group, 4,272 lost their lives. [26] To try and control the stress and morale of the men, casualty rates were never told to the crews by Bomber Command during the war. [27] What little information the men could piece together was usually gathered from the civilian media. [28] That said, the idea that aircrew may have been unaware of the extent of loss rates is misleading. There are no shortages of stories regarding losing friends and fellow aircrew in great numbers. Mr. Baillie recalls at one point bunking up with three other officers, and returning from a night’s operation to find that he was the only survivor. [29] After a Squadron Leader was shot down on an operation, Mr. Baillie was promoted to the position. “There were a lot of promotions over dead men’s backs you know.” [30] Mr. Irwin recalls having made friends with other crews only to have them go missing later on. Thereafter he avoided making friends outside his own crew. [31] Similarly, Mr. Hudson recalled that the men from his own aircraft made an effort not to befriend other crews. “The next day they might be gone.” [32] It was not uncommon for the pilot of an aircraft to openly object to inter-crew friendships, “Knowing how the loss of a close friend could affect an airman’s performance.” [33] In the case of Mr. Hudson, his skipper forbade the crew from volunteering to go on missions with other aircraft that were short a man. The pilot’s policy in this case was the result of an experience directly related to Mr. Hudson. After volunteering to take the position of a sick wireless operator on another crew, Mr. Hudson recalls: “When I got on board that aircraft, knowing our crew and the camaraderie we had, and the discipline we had, this crew [pause] There was no way we [himself and this new crew] were gonna make it.” [34]   When the aircraft he was in was in line for takeoff, the original wireless operator returned, jogging across the airfield to the running Halifax. After quickly briefing the original member of the crew, Mr. Hudson left the Halifax and returned back to base. Later that day he found out that the crew had crashed on returning from the mission, killing everyone but the tail gunner. [35]  

            Crew discipline and camaraderie is a topic seldom discussed in depth in the academic literature of Canada’s Bomber Command. In ­Reap the Whirlwind: The Untold Story of 6 Group, Canada’s Bomber Force of World War II Spencer Dunmore and Dr. William Carter write:

Doubtless this was often the case. Inexperience and a lack of discipline played into the causes of many crew fatalities, or so we may deduce. In this same context, it is important to note that becoming a casualty in the skies over Europe was often the result of factors beyond the control of the crews. In just one of many examples, on a fateful raid to Hamburg on the night of 28 July 1944, many of the crews of No. 6 Group that did not return were the most experienced, [37] and therefore the most likely to have had the discipline necessary to take them that far. Freak accidents were also not uncommon. Mr. Baillie observed, on the last mission of the war for No. 6 Group, a Lancaster inexplicably turning into a Halifax from his own squadron, immediately killing all those on board both aircraft. [38] On this mission to Wangerooge on 25 April 1945, six bombers out of seven lost that day went down as a result of collisions between friendly aircraft. [39] This poignantly demonstrates that even with the experience gained by the Group and aircrews throughout the entire war, luck and circumstance were often the ultimate arbiters of fate.

            Along with flak and fighters, one of the deadliest adversaries of the aircrew and aircraft was the weather. The effects of poor visibility, cloud cover, snow and ice are most commonly discussed in literature when concerning missions being scrubbed, or bombs missing targets. It is interesting to note that aircraft lost to weather-related issues were not always included in the loss totals of an operation. [40] In this sense, weather is often dealt with as though it were a side note to the larger historical issue of mission results and statistics. The reality of the situation was that the weather and its variability played a dominant role in the life of all airmen. It is here that oral history can help us understand the impact on the bomber offensive that the weather had. It also helps us to rationalize what it must have been like, on an intensely human level, for the crew who were operating aircraft that were, by today’s standards, hopelessly ill-equipped for such encounters. In this sense it is by listening to the veterans that we can gain an “authentic testimony,” [41] of the hostile and unforgiving skies over wartime Europe.

            Icing has forever been a nemesis of the aviator. When a wing accumulates enough ice, the airflow is disturbed so that even at high speeds a wing can loose lift and suddenly stall. In many cases, such a stall can lead into a spin. If there is no way to remove the ice from the critical surfaces, and the weather does not allow the aircraft to leave a dangerous icing situation, the results are more often than not fatal.  In 1940s Europe, weather prediction and forecasting was still in its infancy. Although general weather patterns could be predicted, there was little way to assure with accuracy where and at what altitude icing conditions could be expected. Mr. Hudson relates that on one operation his pilot and navigator were briefed to follow a specific course and altitude so as to avoid German radar. After entering cloud and picking up ice that was not forecast, the aircraft started to become unmanageable. After realizing the danger they were suddenly presented with, the pilot made a quick decision and told his crew, “We are going up. To hell with the German Radar!” [42] Three aircraft that stayed at the briefed altitude went down to the effects of icing that night, killing all twenty-one crew members. “I had a rebel for a pilot anyways,” [43] Mr. Hudson recalls. One of Mr. Irwin’s encounters with ice was made worse by the rudder overbalance issue of his early model Halifax. His aircraft lost control and spun from 19,000 to 5,000 feet before recovering. [44] As a pilot, James Baillie recalls that the only measure of defense against icing, other than avoiding it altogether, was a minimally effective greasy substance that could be smeared over the leading edges of the wings. [45] Mr. Baillie recalls this helping a little while on the same mission to Chemnitz when he landed with the aid of Gee. While climbing through a cloud layer after takeoff, his Halifax had picked up some ice on the wings, but was still able to continue the climb above the cloud and out of danger. He recalled thinking to himself that it was odd that there were no other aircraft along with him at that altitude and course. After successfully completing the mission and landing at an alternate airbase because of weather, he was told by his home base commander not to fly back even after the weather had improved. Because so many aircraft had crashed shortly after takeoff that night, base personnel suspected that the fuel used for the mission was contaminated or of the wrong grade, and therefore needed to check his tanks to confirm or deny their suspicions. The reality was that a squall line had formed along their flight path, and icing had decimated the formation of bombers taking off. Icing, as dangerous as it was, was of course not the only concern of the flyer in regards to weather. Winds were often so inaccurately predicted that aircraft overshot targets or became disoriented and lost on the return trip. On an infamous raid to Nuremberg on 30 March 1944, winds were reported as being sixty knots from the west. The reality of the situation was that they were approximately 120 knots. [46] This discrepancy combined with another atmospheric phenomenon, clear sky and a full moon, added to the situation that ultimately resulted in the catastrophic loss of 109 bombers out of 800. [47] The result of the cloud-free and naturally illuminated sky was that the bombers operated in near daylight conditions, allowing the night fighters of the Luftwaffe to strike with relative impunity. Such were the brutal realities of the bomber war over Europe.

            The academic study of history has an affinity for discussing such broad topics as statistics, operational results and leadership decisions to help explain events of the past. What seems to be lacking is a desire to understand the day-to-day experiences of the average individual that shaped these larger events. Perhaps the personal experience is seen as being too insignificant or unique to the individual to help explain the broader processes of history. However, when the individual recollection is examined alongside a multitude of contemporary accounts and secondary sources, an image can sometimes form for the researcher that aids in explaining the subtle realities of the past which dictated major historical patterns and events. It is here that oral history offers a unique insight into the intricacies of human life. By continuing with the collection of oral history, we are able to at least partially preserve the memories of veterans. In accomplishing this, we not only aid in our current and future understanding of the past, but we also show the proper respect due to the men and women who gave so much of themselves in war, so that we could live in peace.

Appendix

(A)

Halifax II W7710/LQ-R, Ruhr Valley Express. 1942, in Larry Milberry, Canada’s Air Force: At War and Peace Vol 2. (Toronto: CANAV Books, 2000), 43. 

(B)

Halifax III LW119/QB-O of 424 Squadron, seen at Skipton-on-Swale. 1942, in Larry Milberry, Canada’s Air Force: At War and Peace Vol 2. (Toronto: CANAV Books, 2000), 79.        

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