



RUSI

Newsletter of the Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island

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Suggestions are encouraged.

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**The RUSI Calendar of
Events is on page 8.**

Command and Staff Transformation

By LCol (Ret) J.C. Berezowski

Last year Canada announced a new defence policy for the Canadian Forces. It was posited that in today's complex and chaotic world, our troops could be easily engaged in a "three-block-war".

Missions could overlap in urban warfare where our forces could be engaged in combat against a well-armed militia in one city block, stabilization operations in the next block, and humanitarian relief and reconstruction two blocks over. Concurrently, our naval forces in adjacent coastal areas might be supporting troops ashore while enforcing a maritime exclusion zone and our air forces could be flying in supplies and humanitarian aid while standing by to directly engage a determined opponent.

The transformation of the CF command and control structure is the key first step to ensuring the effectiveness of the CF in the decades ahead, according to the Chief of the Defence Staff, Gen. Rick Hillier. Under transformation, the CDS has directed that a new entity – the Strategic Joint Staff (SJS) – be created to provide direct support for his two main roles: Commander of the CF, and principal military advisor to the Government. Moreover, it will enable the CDS to effect strategic command, allowing him to plan and control operations in order to achieve strategic, operational and tactical objectives. This staff will be supported by a Strategic Command Centre linked to CF operational commands, selected other government departments, allied staffs and non-governmental organizations. It will be command-centric with a clear and unambiguous chain of command

At the Ottawa Congress Centre on

Jan. 31 last, a ceremony marked the transfer of CF operations to the newly created operational commands from the exiting Deputy Chief of Defence Staff Group. The CDS introduced the commanders of the four new commands: VAdm Jean-Yves Forcier, commander, Canada Command; MGen Michel Gauthier, commander, Canadian Expeditionary Force Command; BGen Daniel Benjamin, commander, Canadian Operational Support Command; and Col David Barr, commander, Canadian Special Operations Forces Command. With the formal signing of the Activation Scrolls by the four respective new commanders and the CDS, this event marked the beginning of the biggest changes for the CF in decades.

Canada Command (Canada COM): defines its area of responsibility as Continental North America (Canada, Continental USA (48 contiguous states and Alaska, and Mexico) and their approaches. It exercises command over allocated units: Joint Task Forces North, Pacific, West, Central, East and Atlantic, and all other assigned units within Canada. It is located in the Star Top Building east of Ottawa, along with CEF-COM. It will become the nerve centre of all Canadian military operations. The design has incorporated cutting-edge technology and the operations room is loaded with state of the art technology.

In conjunction with Government House, work has begun on the development of the official badges that will represent the new operational commands. In the meantime, authorized circular logos have been developed for various less formal identification purposes. For example,

Canada Command logo will have a stylistic representation of Canada and North America with Canada highlighted in white. In Regional logos, the area of responsibility of each JTF is highlighted in white while the rest of Canada is grey-shaded.

Canadian Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM): All exercises and operations outside Canada now come under CEFCOM who assumed functions of DCDS and CF Joint HQ in Kingston. The Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) has been reassigned from the former DCDS Group; in addition, CEFCOM formally assumed command of overseas operations including: Task Force (TF) Golan, TF El Gorah, TF Middle East; TF Democratic Republic of Congo; TF Freetown; TF Cyprus; TF Tampa; Port au Prince; TF Sudan; TF Balkans; TF Iraq; TF Afghanistan; TF Addis Ababa; TF Standing NATO Maritime Group One; TF Jerusalem.

Canadian Operational Support Command (CANOSCOM): becomes a single focal point for all CF operational support at the national level for operations whether domestic or abroad, under Ministerial approval. It will have under command: CF Joint Signals Regiment and newly created Canadian Materiel Support Group (CMSG) with CF Postal Unit, 3CSG and 4 CFMCU from ADM (MAT) Group. CMSG has been assigned the following units which had reported to ADM (MAT): 7 CFSD, 25 CFSD, CFAD Angus, CFAD Bedford, CFAD Dundurn, and CFAD Rocky Point.

CF Health Services Group, 202 Workshop Depot and Communication Reserve will be under Operational Control of Comd CANOSCOM for appropriate aspect of support to CF operations.

Also, J6/COS (IM), J3 ENGR/DGME and CFPM will be responsive to Comd CONASCOM for op-

erational support matters within their respective jurisdictions.

Of note, CF Joint Operations Group will be disbanded within the next 12 months.

Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM): organizational changes include the allocation of Joint Task Force Two (JTF2) and Joint Nuclear Biological and Chemical Defence Company (CF JNBCD COY) to CANSOFCOM. As well, 427 Tactical Helicopter Sqn has been assigned to CANSOFCOM. One of the key elements will be the newly established Canadian Special Operations Regiment. This battalion-sized unit will be drawn from across the CF and will be able to deploy highly trained special operations people domestically and abroad. The tan beret will now be worn by all members of CANSOFCOM. It is an internationally recognized symbol of special operations forces.

Strategic Joint Staff (SJS): Cmdre Dan Murphy is the first Director of Staff. The SJS works directly for the CDS and is composed of four divisions: Operations, Plans, Requirements and Military Partnerships and Defence Liaison. The strategic operations staff role and specified command functions of the former DCDS Group have been transferred to SJS. Key roles are to provide timely and effective military analysis and decision support to the CDS: enable planning, initiation, direction and control of strategic level operations; and oversee those involved in military partnership and defence liaison activities. This will include: CDLS Washington, CDLS London, CFSU Europe, CFSU Colorado Springs, Directorate of Protocol and Foreign Liaison, Military Security Guard Unit, all Canadian Defence Attaché units.

Standing Contingency Task Force (SCTF): it will be a standing,

integrated, seaborne and sea-based expeditionary joint amphibious force intended to be the first substantial CF response to an emerging crisis in the world's littoral battle spaces. It is to consist of a headquarters, an embedded Team Canada (diplomacy, defence, development, commerce) element, an amphibious task group, a light battalion landing force, a naval task group, an air expeditionary unit and a support organization. Next fall in Halifax, a SCTF Working Group will conduct a live "Proof of Concept" exercise to refine a concept of operations.

Transformation So what? As noted by several critical observers of this vision, the CF transformation is in its early stages and it remains to be decided what residual force generation functions will remain with the Navy, Army and Air Force chiefs. Others foresee the shades of Mr. Hellyer's 1964 defence unification scheme lurking in the shadows. However, a more urgent concern is the apparent dominant mix of field general staff operational procedures over national general staff strategic functions. In the event of a major international crisis, this could culminate into a clash of cross-purposes and the law of unintended consequences could arise once more. ☼

With files from The Maple Leaf and Canadian Military Journal Winter 2005-2006

Command Changes

National Defence Minister

The Honourable Gordon O'Connor became minister of National Defence on Feb. 6 in Canada's new Conservative government. First elected to the House of Commons in 2004 and re-elected in 2006, he served as Conservative Defence critic and was on the Standing Committee for National Defence and Veterans Affairs.

In one of his first major public speeches as Minister, he addressed

the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) in Ottawa Feb. 23. Building on the "Canada First" defence strategy, he said the new policy is quite simple: "It's about having a three-ocean Navy, a robust Army and a revitalized Air Force."

He pointed to his own 32 years in the CF, describing it as a "big family" which must be taken care of. "We need to support our troops when they are deployed, but we also need to be at their side after they have returned, and we need to support their families."

The new minister began his career in the Army's Armour branch. He was commissioned 2Lt from the Officer Candidate Program in 1963 and posted to the Royal Canadian Dragoons. He served with the RCD as a squadron commander in the rank of major. As LCol, he commanded the RCD in Germany following which he served at NDHQ, eventually as a BGen responsible for managing Army development programs.

Prior to his election, Mr. O'Connor was a senior associate at Hill & Knowlton Canada.

He is married and has two children. ☼

New Chief Maritime Staff

Vice Admiral Drew Robertson was officially installed as Chief of the Maritime Staff on Jan. 17. He replaces VAdm Bruce MacLean who is retiring after being the Navy's top sailor since Aug. 2004.

Recently, VAdm Robertson commanded the Canadian task group during Op APOLLO, Canada's contribution to the campaign against terrorism in the Gulf war. Before that, he served as a combat officer in HMCS *Skeena*, executive officer of HMCS *Provider* and commander of HMCS *Annapolis* and *Athabaskan*.

His naval career began in 1973, graduating from RMC in engineering physics as a sub-lieutenant. ☼

The difference Asian Multipolarity makes

By Kerry Lynn Nankivell

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Canadian Forces, the Department of National Defence or the Canadian Government.

The Asian landscape is not unfamiliar, especially to analysts of security issues. For more than a decade, Asia-watchers have noted the shift eastward of the world's strategic centre of gravity. This shift was heralded by the amazing rise of China whose economic, military and diplomatic weight was gaining momentum. It portended profound permanent changes to the international scene.

As a result, geo-strategic analysts seemed to fall rather comfortably and perhaps too quickly, into a familiar mindset of bipolarity, pitting a rising China against the *status quo* power of the United States. Analysts and scholars alike made a cliché of the defining assertion that the 21st century would be the emergence of a new and challenging rival to Washington.

Beijing's transformation was so astonishing that meanwhile, developments in India, Thailand, Japan and even Russia from 1995 to 2005 proceeded apace but were not fully integrated into the image of tomorrow's Asia. This omission and the consideration of a regional structure of tomorrow's Asia will be considered here.

Tomorrow's Asia will likely have more multipolar than unipolar features. The result will be a continent of several ambitious, but wary competitors, and not a stable antagonism between two poles, only. What difference will multipolarity make for powers lying offshore and around the Pacific Rim that want to engage and shape the continent?

Asian Wallflowers

The surreal explosion of China onto the international scene has made wallflowers of the very impressive indicators of the germination of major powers elsewhere on the continent. It is in economic terms that this appears most starkly. China's unbelievable double-digit growth sustained for 15 years, has overshadowed the achievements and potential re-emergence of its neighbors. For instance, the mantra "India Shining" aptly describes the country, which has averaged six per cent growth over the last three years, much higher than the average among G8 countries.

At the same time, Japan, still the world's second largest economy seems finally on track to emerge from a long recession, posting growth in most quarters throughout 2004 and 2005. Meanwhile, in Southeast Asia, sub-regional countries are quickly recovering from the 1997 Financial Crisis that was the worst meltdown in history.

Through increased regional trade and by exporting to a growing China, Thailand and Malaysia in particular have accomplished impressive recoveries. The regional economic outlook is rounded out by robust post-9/11 figures out of the fully developed economies that anchor the region: Singapore, Australia and South Korea.

However, Asian nations are not only rising economically, the region's economic boom is like a midwife to the political and military rise of several states in the transformation of capability, doctrine and strategic aims. Japan, Russia, China, Australia and India, concurrent with junior players Malaysia and Thailand, are increasing in military power and their publics are responding by demonstrating ever-

more insistent forms of national pride and sense of purpose.

This has not escaped Australia on the exposed south flank of the Pacific Rim. The Australian Defence Force (ADF) is embarking on its biggest weapons buying spree since World War II, spending \$52 billion on new planes, ships and tanks. This massive expenditure will make Australia's navy, army and air force among the most powerful and high-tech militaries in the region well into the 21st century. The Special Advisor to Canada's Maritime Forces Pacific¹ said: "Australia lives in a tough and problematic neighborhood, but it is more than that. They have full, bi-partisan political support for the Australian Defence Force and a much more muscular and informed public debate on defence issues than we do in Canada. It is perhaps no surprise that General Cosgrove, the veteran of East Timor, was the third most popular figure in Australia when he was the Chief of the Defence Staff."

Nothing New

The changes to the Asian landscape are nothing new to the seasoned Asia-watcher; in fact, they have been long underway and much debated. Nonetheless, considering the strategic future of Asia, analysts often seem to miss the forest for the trees. Few questions have been asked about the implications of this concurrent growth relative to the continent as a whole. What are the contours, shapes and vectors of the Asian forest into the next century?

For example, taken on its own, China's meteoric rise in economic, political and military terms seems almost boundless and its achievement of parity to the United States a certainty. But when we take note of economic changes in neighbouring India (that may limit China's entry into the service sector industries), as well as naval changes there and in Japan, South Korea and Australia, (which will put pressure on China's

attempts to expand its sphere of influence away from its shores) we realize that there will surely be obstacles on China's road to parity with the U.S.A.

Chinese planners approach the region's multipolarity through modernization rather than planning for a single adversary, or single conflict. Recent Chinese military disclosures seem less concerned with identifying potential future enemies (besides the United States and Russia) than in detailing how China's military modernization plans will bridge the "era gap" in emerging weaponry. Modernization though is not simply aimed at reaching parity with powers across the Pacific, but also aimed at establishing China's regional position as a first-among-equals amid a variety of already-powerful Asian militaries.¹

Most importantly for Asia-watchers located abroad, Asian multipolarity will also necessarily complicate approaches to the region. While a bipolar system such as a Cold War Europe, offered a comparatively simplistic balancing calculus, navigating relations across a multipolar region requires substantially more nuance and panache. A multipolar system defies the logic of 'with us or against us' just as it defies any attempt to keep states 'down' or 'in' or 'out'. Instead, a multipolar Asia will be prone to unstable relationships and periods of shifting allegiances without bedrock alliances as competing powers, wary of one another, guard their sovereignty and act supremely in their national interest.

This will necessarily have important lessons for those approaching the region. For instance, if the coming years are to be characterized by a bi-polar confrontation between Beijing and Washington, then Washington's recent deals with New Delhi might be understood as a clever manoeuvre intended to balance China's growing military might. If, however, Asia is likely characterized by multipolarity rather than bipolarity, the move is a curious legitimization of

India's rogue nuclear weapons program. As an aspiring regional power, India will not allow itself to be bound by this favour to aligning itself with Washington; more likely, it will reap rewards while maximizing its national power.

Nations on the Pacific Rim will be inexorably drawn into this geo-strategic vortex and will need to deploy all of their strategic savvy for successful navigation. The most prudent path remains unclear and hotly contested. Some argue that the most prudent path in this uncertain environment is to guard against all contingencies, perhaps through the development of an overarching defensive system like Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD). It is not at all clear whether such an approach would mitigate threat, or inflame an already-competitive environment.

Canada's decision last year not to support BMD does not yet seem to have closed the debate, both technical and philosophical. Controversy persists, in part, because Canada's decision is at odds with the view of the United States, which maintains that the deployment of effective missile defences is an essential element of the broader defence of North America as a whole. Furthermore, missile defence systems are also endorsed by policy makers in Tokyo, Taipei, New Delhi and Canberra, all of whom plan to install or have stated their support in principle for a missile defence system in their home region. All of these states contend that the BMD system is a purely defensive capability designed to meet the uncertainty of the new century.

In North America, Washington has steamed ahead without Ottawa. The US Quadrennial Defense Review released in early February describes missile defense alongside 'steady-state' operations including "North American air defense, including air sovereignty operations".² It is described as part of a

“tailored defense” designed for a world populated with a diversity of threats and opportunities. Canada has never been asked to participate directly in BMD – no Canadian radar station, nor Canadian territory on which to station interceptors. Nonetheless, Ottawa opted for non-participation in 2004. The cost of this position has been accepting a place on the sidelines of an important facet of strategic planning with respect to the North American continent. Whether this will remain Canada’s position, or whether Ottawa will devise some other strategy with which to approach the Asia of the 21st century remains to be seen.

Understanding Multipolarity

A multipolar Asia will not provide us with the same kind of certainty in the next century that a bipolar Europe offered in the preceding one. There are a range of policy approaches that may help nations on this side of the Pacific Rim better succeed in reaping the benefits of Asian dynamism while staving off threats associated with instability. Determining which policy approaches will be the most successful in the Canadian case will be no easy task and will require that we understand issues in this new context. Understanding the implications of unstable multipolarity in Asia is all the more complex because it hasn’t been an important structural feature of the international system for almost a full century. The last time policymakers on this side of the Pacific contended with a regional multipolar system was in the late 19th and early 20th century. European powers struggled to keep peace amongst each other.

This regional system was found particularly unappealing by US policymakers of the period, as it highlighted all the characteristics antithetical to the US national spirit: greed, self-interest, amorality, duplicity, elitism and, ultimately, betrayal. The reaction of the US

Congress was a growing aloofness from European affairs.

Today, as the global hegemonic and leading power in Asia, Washington will not likely have the luxury of opting for retreat to the high ground. Canada will be similarly affected by Asia, as a nation on the Pacific Rim and boasting impressive Pacific-oriented economic growth and interests. No doubt, the successful strategy to approaching the region in the coming decades will require skill and nuance, but first it will require recognition of the difference that multipolarity makes. ☸

Ms Kerry Lynn Nankivell is an analyst with the Office of the Special Advisor (Policy), Maritime Forces Pacific Headquarters, Esquimalt, BC.

1. Dr. Jim Boutilier, MARPAC HQ
2. Mary C. FitzGerald, Hudson Institute in Armed Forces Journal, Nov. 2005
3. Quadrennial Defense Review, US Department of Defense, 2006. p.37.
4. David J. Trachtenberg, Armed Forces Journal, Jan.2006

Operation Eclipse

The race to save Denmark from the Russians, May 1945

By Maj (Ret) Tony Hibbert, *Pegasus Journal*, winter 2005

(And the Canadian connection - Ed)

The Challenge:

Liberation of Denmark from Germany: In Denmark, the end of World War II is celebrated on May 4th, when the German High Command signed the instrument of surrender of their Forces in Denmark. Brigadier Lathbury, with the Headquarters of 1st Parachute Brigade landed on Copenhagen Airfield on May 7, 1945 to take the surrender.

The Russian threat

On April 28, the Allies had obtained firm intelligence that the Russians intended to take and hold Denmark in defiance of the Yalta Agreement and had dispatched an armoured division to invade Denmark from the south via Lübeck, Kiel and Flensburg. This adventure had to be stopped but without incur-

ring the armed conflict between Russia and the Allies for which Hitler and his High Command had been praying.

The Allied Response

On May 1, Eisenhower ordered the immediate move of a strong Royal Navy flotilla to Copenhagen and a light cover of specialized troops to Kiel and Denmark, but the key to the plan was the dispatch of a strong force to reach Wismar at the north end of the Yalta demarcation line “before the Russians arrived and to stop the Russians there.”

At 0800 hours on May 1, the 3rd Parachute Brigade, under its famous and charismatic commander, Brigadier James Hill, was allocated the Divisional Artillery, a squadron of the Royal Scots Greys and transport for some of his troops and was ordered to punch a 60-mile corridor to Wismar through a strongly defended area with many German units still resisting. So close to the end of hostilities there was an understandable reluctance by commanders not to expose their troops to unnecessary risks. Nevertheless Hill’s leading 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion under LCol G.F. Eadie reached Wismar at 0900 hrs May 2 and the main body was in position by 1200 hrs – 60 miles in 25 hours, a truly heroic feat – four hours ahead of the Russians.

The leading tanks of Rokossovskii’s Armoured Division hit Hill’s Brigade at 1600 hrs and there they were stopped; four hours that saved Denmark.

Wismar

Wismar was the key to the whole operation. If the door could be bolted before the Russians arrived, Denmark would be safe. If the Russians got there first, all the forces sent to Kiel and Denmark would be too little, too late and Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein might remain on the wrong side of the Iron Curtain for the next 50 years.

The nearest Allied unit to Wis-

mar was the 6th Airborne Division, which had fought all the way from Normandy and had just completed an assault crossing of the Elbe at Lauenburg, 60 miles south of Wismar.

At 1800 hrs on April 29 their commander, MGen Bols, received urgent and peremptory orders to advance immediately to capture and hold Wismar, “before the Russians get there.”

For this operation, he had the 3rd and 5th Parachute Brigades and was allocated an escort of a squadron of the Royal Scot Greys (of Balaclava fame), the divisional artillery and transport for his lightly armed parachute troops. It took 14 hours to assemble ‘Wismar-Force’ on the start line.

May 1 0800 hrs: 3rd and 5th Parachute Brigades ordered to advance 60 miles to Wismar at maximum speed on separate parallel routes converging on Gadebusch, 20 miles south of Wismar. After this there was only a single route. Whichever Brigade reached Gadebusch first would win the race to Wismar. 3rd Parachute Brigade was commanded by the legendary brigadier James Hill who had commanded 1st Parachute Battalion in North Africa where he was seriously wounded. On his return to the UK, he commanded 3rd Parachute Brigade and led them from D-Day onwards receiving another three wounds.

One of our most experienced and decorated fighting commanders; he was determined to be the first into Wismar. The two Brigades had to plough their way through more than a million terrified German refugees fleeing from the approaching Russians. The fully armed German troops lining the roads had received no instructions of any Cease Fire discussions (which did not start until three days later) and Hill met frequent roadblocks and pockets of resistance. The speed of the ad-

vance took the Germans by surprise and where there was resistance, the guns of the Scots Greys shot their way through. Urged on by Brigadier Hill, the 3rd Parachute Brigade was the first to reach Gadebusch and Wismar.

May 2 0900: Brigadier Hill’s Advance Guard of the 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion entered Wismar and cleared the town with the help of the Scots Greys. A fighting advance of 60 miles in 25 hours, much of it by night was no mean feat.

1200: Remainder of 3rd Parachute Brigade arrived and set up defensive position facing East. LCol John Bishop was a Lt transport officer with 1 Cdn Gds." John is a member of RUSI VI.

1600: Advance Guard of Russian Armoured Division entered Wismar. Some Russian tanks slipped through Hill’s position and reached the outskirts of Lübeck (over 40 miles from Wismar). When the Russian main body arrived in Wismar, their leading tanks surrounded the Canadian position and held them and brigadier Hill under restraint. When the Brigadier threatened his Russian opposite number with the weight of the Divisional Artillery and the firepower of a rocket-firing Typhoon squadron, the Russians withdrew from Wismar. This stalemate was maintained for a further five days until Field Marshal Montgomery flew up to meet the celebrated but very disgruntled Russian Marshal Rokossovskii who had been give the task of capturing Denmark.

Condensed from the original by Brigadier (Ret) Maurice Tugwell, who was a platoon commander in the race to Wismar – Ed.

Epilogue: Exercise HOLD-FAST – 18 to 26 Sept. 1960

By LCol (Ret) J.C. Berzowski

Exercise HOLDFAST was one of the largest NATO exercises staged in northern Federal Republic of

Germany during the Cold War. Conducted by the 1st British Corps, it was the operational test of the Bundeswehr’s 6th Panzer-Grenadier Division (6PZ) to confirm operational readiness for assignment to NATO. (Because of the existing terms of occupation at the time, no German formations were permitted above divisional level.) HOLD-FAST involved sea, land and air forces with some 80,000 troops participating. The Blue Force 6PZ was to defend south along the autobahn from east of Hamburg to Lübeck on the Baltic coast. In behind were a Danish division on the Kiel Canal and a second Danish reserve division being mobilized in Denmark.

For the exercise, the autobahn was declared the Kleine Mollige (an excellent local beer) Canal.

The enemy Orange Force was built around 4 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group (4CIBG) concentrated southeast of Hamburg about 20 kilometers from the Soviet Zone and south of Wismar. Their mission was to simulate a Warsaw Pact force, attacking northwest forcing a crossing of the hypothetical canal; then proceeding northwest to capture a crossing on the Kiel Canal into Denmark.

Under cover of darkness, 2nd Battalion, The Black Watch (RHC) was vanguard for 4CIBG and succeeded in “winkling” across the “Canal” in a number of spots. After the brigade reorganized in the forward assembly area, the Black Watch pushed off on the Violet route to the west while 1st Canadian Guards moved east and north along Scarlet route, heading for the Kiel Canal. The 2nd Queen’s Own Rifles were brigade reserve; A Battery, 1 RCHA and A Sqn 8th Canadian Hussars with Centurion tanks supported the Guards. B Battery, 1 RCHA and B Sqn 8th Canadian Hussars supported The Black Watch battle group.

The advance northward proceeded unimpeded for some while.

The Panzer Grenadiers were awaiting the massed attack prescribed by Soviet doctrine of the past (war). Meanwhile the Canadians pushed forward along two axes causing some havoc in the rear areas of 6PZ. The FOO with the vanguard on Violet route spotted a bundle of telephone cables laid out along the roadside ditch. Knowing that the Germans preferred land line over radio, he cut the bundle with pliers wrapping one end around the spare tire of his jeep. After driving some 100 yards, he cut the other end and drove off.

Mid-afternoon, the vanguard encountered its first serious opposition from 6 PZ at the major highway and railroad junction of Innien. A battle group attack was mounted with tanks and artillery in support. The umpires declared the town captured about 1600 hrs when the German troops were caught sun-tanning outside their tanks, by a regimental artillery fire plan (hypothetical) that bombarded their positions. In the meantime, during a right flanking by a troop of four centurion tanks from B Sqn, three tanks ended fouled in a peat bog. The grand finale to this phase was one of the most horrendous traffic jams in Innien since the Second World War.

The next day saw a British airborne assault go in at three drop zones on the Canal and a British assault landing on the eastern edge of Kiel by a battalion with a squadron of tanks, all as part of Orange Force. Meanwhile, intensive air sorties were flown against both sides.

For the grand finale, the Canadians were umpired back from the Kiel Canal (having penetrated too swiftly) to defensible high ground. After 6PZ had redeployed to a new start line, they had the opportunity to launch one final assault on the dug-in units of 4CIBG.

Some of today's RUSI VI members participated in Ex HOLD-

FAST. They are Brigadier Maurice Tugwell who, as a major and 2ic of 1st Parachute Battalion, parachuted at the Kiel Canal. MGen Herb Pitts was a QOR of C captain serving as LO2 at 4CIBG Headquarters. Col Gene Lake was a 2Lt with B Squadron, 8 Canadian Hussars. LCol Cec Berezowski was a captain and B Battery artillery forward observation officer with 2nd Black Watch, serving with three successive vanguard companies on the Violet route for a continuous period of nearly 40 hours (and ran out of rations). Capt Nick Pyrch was a gun position officer with A Bty, 1 RCHA

Undoubtedly, the author of Exercise HOLDFAST was familiar with the Russian attempt to occupy Denmark in the final days of the Second World War. ☸

2006 ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING

The 2006 Annual General meeting of RUSI of VI was called to order on Wednesday, March 16, 2006 by Cmdre Ted Heath, following the luncheon speaker. He announced that Mr. Elliot Pence, one of the two Book Award winners was present and called upon Col Bill Weston to present the book prize.

Col Weston complimented the UVic history graduate on having been selected for excellence in European history and presented the book gift. The second winner was Jason Swanson for excellence in Canadian history but was out of town. Col Bill Weston reported that the book prize program for military history undergraduates at UVic would continue, and be awarded upon the recommendation of the university.

Following adoption of the minutes, the treasurer (and past president), MGen Bob Stewart, presented the financial statement and the 2006 budget. Both were accepted by the members present. He

also reported that more RUSI VI ties had been ordered plus a dozen ladies' ties with loop in the same material.

The treasurer explained that the 2006 budget was based upon a plan similar to 2005: eight luncheon meetings and a Christmas party; four issues of the Newsletter; and, a slightly smaller membership. It was explained that the catering costs have increased for this year but the Board has increased the luncheon charge to \$18.00. Upon a motion from the floor, all members attending future luncheon meetings were asked to wear name tags. Another suggestion was that June being an open month, could the possibility of another meeting be considered. The matter was left open.

The president, Cmdre Ted Heath, announced that the retiring directors were: MGen Bob Stewart, Col Peter Green, LCol Ken Reeves and Maj Doug Munro. He thanked them for their dedicated service which was supported by a round of applause from the members.

He then asked the past president to conduct the election. MGen Bob Stewart announced that all other serving directors were standing for re-election and that the new nominees were: Col Gene Lake, Army; BGen Don Macnamara, Air and Maj Tom Body, Army logistics (militia).

All nominees were elected for 2006/07 and installed.

Col John Eggenberger assumed the presidency for 2006 and thanked Cmdre T Heath for his excellent service as past president and made special mention of MGen Stewart for his many years on the board as president and the past number of years as treasurer. The meeting adjourned at 1515 hrs. ☸

MARK YOUR CALENDAR

12 APRIL MEETING

- ⇒ **SPEAKER: Rear-Admiral R. Girouard, OMM, CD – Comd MARPAC**
- ⇒ **TOPIC: Canadian Forces Transformation**
- ⇒ **PLACE: The Canadian Scottish Officers' Mess, Room 314, Bay Street Armoury**
- ⇒ **TIME: 1130 FOR 1200 Hrs Luncheon**
- ⇒ **COST: \$18.00 (pay at the door)**

RAAdm Roger Girouard became commander Maritime Command Pacific on 25 Jul 2005. He previously commanded Canadian Fleet Pacific following Op APOLLO in the Gulf in 2003. Staff tours in 2003/04 included DG Maritime Personnel and special advisor to Chief of Maritime Comd, Halifax. In 1999 in East Timor, he was Cdn Joint Task Force commander for Op Toucan. Promoted captain (N) at Halifax in 1996, he helped coordinate the SWISSAIR 111 salvage and recovery. He commanded HMC Ships Iroquois, Miramachi, and Chaleur after tours with Athabaskan, Algonquin, Ottawa, Qu'Appelle, Miramichi and Mackenzie. He obtained an MA from Royal Roads University in 2001. A native of Montreal, he was a reserve boatswain at HMCS Carleton in Ottawa before joining Regular Force as a MARS officer cadet in 1974.

10 MAY MEETING

- ⇒ **SPEAKER: Dr. Jim Boutilier, Special Advisor (Policy) MARPAC**
- ⇒ **TOPIC: A Personal View of the World**
- ⇒ **PLACE: The Canadian Scottish Officers' Mess, Room 314, Bay Street Armoury**
- ⇒ **TIME: 1130 FOR 1200 Hrs Luncheon**
- ⇒ **COST: \$18.00 (pay at the door)**

Dr. Boutilier received his PHD from the University of London in 1969 and took up his first university teaching post at the University of the South Pacific in Suva, Fiji, in the same year. In 1971 he took up an appointment at Royal Roads Military College in Victoria, becoming over the following 24 years a department head, dean of arts and full professor. In addition, Dr. Boutilier holds an adjunct professorship in Pacific studies at the University of Victoria. His principal research area is defence and security in the Asia-Pacific Region. He lectures nationally and internationally on current developments in the Pacific.

13 SEPTEMBER MEETING

- ⇒ **SPEAKER: Brigadier General W.D. Macnamara, OMM, CD,(Ret)**
- ⇒ **TOPIC: National or Notional Security?**
- ⇒ **PLACE: The Canadian Scottish Officers' Mess, Room 314, Bay Street Armoury**
- ⇒ **TIME: 1130 FOR 1200 Hrs Luncheon**
- ⇒ **COST: \$18.00 (pay at the door)**

BGen Don Macnamara had a 37 year career in the Canadian Forces retiring in 1988. A specialist in national and international security affairs and strategic analysis, he had staff and academic tours in these areas during the last 15 years of his service. He is past president of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies and immediate past president of the Conference of Defence Assns. Initially an air traffic control officer, he spent 18 years as a biosciences officer in operations research including flight safety, accident analysis, weapons effects and protective equipment research. He holds a BA (UWestern Ont.), MA (UofT) and DScMil (honoris causa) from RMC. He attended CF Staff College and National Defence College. He was with Queen's School of Business from 1988 until 2002.

Presidents Message:

With our Armed Forces embarked upon transformation, we of RUSI have a special responsibility to use our experience and bring to the fore responsible views on the present status, future plans and the impact of transformation upon our forces national and international employment capabilities. In so doing we must not permit ourselves to be labeled as "dinosaurs", living in an irrelevant past - else our counsel will be rejected out of hand. It seems to me that one option we can use is to search for fundamentals that through the ages have characterised successful armed forces, which in recent haste may not have been given adequate attention, and offer positive comment on these issues, either in our newsletter or in our opinions section of our RUSI VI website. Cheers, John