| Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island | ||||||||||||||
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The School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University, Kingston, in cooperation with the Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDAI), has published a new study, The National Transformation of Defence Administration, in the Claxton Papers series on research into Canada’s defence policy.
Canada’s future defence policy and military capabilities were defined, in the spring of 2005, by the Liberal government’s promise of a significant, multi-year funding allocation to national defence. This decision signals an intention to radically transform and rebuild the Canadian Forces. Reaching this goal is greatly dependent on how national policy and the transformation of the Canadian Forces are administered, not only within the Department of National Defence, but also in other government departments and in those central agencies responsible for significant programs related to national defence. Bringing policy intentions and administrative outcomes together is the next great challenge for the Government, especially for the Minister of National Defence.
This Claxton Paper illustrates the deep difficulties in the present system of defence administration and makes these main points:
The study concludes that in order for the new defence policy to succeed, the government must revamp major aspects of the defence administrative organizations, processes, and methods as an essential first step towards the transformation of the Canadian Forces. The aim should be nothing less then to build, from the ground up if necessary, a modern, proficient, government-wide system of defence administration appropriate to the demands facing the Canadian Forces; a system that is responsive to the needs of the government and Parliament.
Neither vision nor hope can substitute for dollars spent and political will carried forward. If the government expects to halt the loss of defence capabilities and succeed in transforming the Canadian Forces in the next five years, then it must lead the process, direct the bureaucratic system to this end, and do it quickly.
The strong will of the Minister of National Defence, the Chief of the Defence Staff, and the Deputy Minister of National Defence will not suffice to redress this deep national problem, for they do not and cannot control the government-wide processes that produce defence outcomes. The prime minister must lead this national effort and demand from Ministers effective reforms that can be implemented quickly, efficiently, and economically.
This report is available at www.queensu.ca/sps/defence/publications/ClaxtonNo6.pdf
Contacts:
Dr. Douglas Bland, Chair in Defence Management Studies, Queen’s University School of Policy Studies, editor of this Claxton Paper at 613-533-6483, db26@post.queensu.ca
Alain Pellerin, Executive Director Conference of Defence Associations Institute, 613-236-1252, director@cda-cdai.ca
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