Much has been made of late as to Canada’s loss of influence in world affairs. The reasons are legion, and too many to explore in this short piece. Most observers, however, agree that the loss of influence is directly tied to the declining fortunes of the Canadian Forces (CF). While agreeing with that assessment, we aim to further the discussion by contributing some practical markers down the road to recovery.

Our proposal is rooted in the now developing adjustment of military capabilities by our NATO allies to a world fundamentally changed by the ending of the Cold War. Led by the United States and Britain, they have responded to the need to contain and suppress the rise of regional conflict and international terrorism by equipping their forces for effective and rapid deployment to operational theatres by sea and air.

Simply put, we propose that the Canadian Forces establish a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), deployable primarily by sea in purpose-built amphibious ships that will sail within days of the order, and be ready for operations upon arrival in-theatre. We feel that the primary fighting unit most likely to gain military success and diplomatic influence is what we like to term the “Basic Old-Fashioned Infantry Brigade” (BOFIB); we have affectionately styled the amphibious ships “Sea Horses”– hence the title of this piece.

A fuller discussion of this proposal, entitled “An Appreciation Meeting the Needs of Joint Overseas Deployments of Canadian Forces in Support of Our Foreign Policies,” has been prepared in the traditional format of a Military Appreciation. Readers may find it and related material posted to the web-site of the Vancouver Island branch of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI): www.rusiviccda.org.

(Highlights of that Military Appreciation are inserted hereafter in lieu of the original article’s narrative. – ed.)

The Joint Military Appreciation

The Aim - in a timely fashion, transport a force of a size consistent with Canada’s international role, from Canada by sea and/or air and provide it with appropriate initial and long-term tactical naval, air and logistic support to a location for a defined range and duration of operations.

Limitations - force configuration shall be based on current assets where possible and new assets where demanded by the requirement.

The accomplishment of the international aim will not divert assets from current Canadian Forces responsibilities.

FACTORS

Force Range of Operations

Discussion

The mandate calls for a self-sufficient force, capable at all times of engaging in high level combat. The force must be interoperable with US, UN, or NATO allies in order to conduct, and/or contribute to a full range of operational tasks i.e., war, stabilization, or peacekeeping on the international stage.

Coping with this variety of demands will call for considerable forethought and preparation.

Deduction

The defined range of operations includes the conduct of high level combat, thence contributions to international “stabilization” tasking (oft-times described as “peace making”), as well as tasks more popularly known as “peace-keeping”, internal disaster relief, aid to civil power and sovereignty.

Force Capability

Discussion

The force must be capable of meeting and defeating threats that include among others; “insurgents,” individual and groupings of terrorists, “regular” forces not yet subdued, fielded enemy forces that are formed along traditional lines and so on.

Deductions

Any expeditionary force must train together, stay together and learn to fight together, so as to be able to cope with the “unexpected” – in any confrontation.

Joint operations command and control and effective delivery of combat power must be practiced and tested.

Confidence and trust between sea, land and air is essential, and can only be generated by rigorous joint training, for the range of operations envisaged.

Force Composition

Discussion

It would be folly to send an expeditionary force off to do Canada’s work by assembling an ad hoc force each time called upon and then sending them off with inadequate training, lacking sustainability and having not developed and practiced joint command and control procedures.

Deductions

A minimum force would be an infantry battalion battle group including appropriate supporting elements. This battle group must train together in order to develop the appropriate joint operational techniques, command and control procedures, thereby engendering trust and confidence so vital to mission success.

It will be necessary to draw the minimum force from a rapid reaction force of brigade size. The Brigade would consist of three battle groups of 800 to 1,000 men each. Two would be transported by sea. The third will be light and deliverable by air landing with a company that could alternatively be delivered by parachute. The initial priority will be one battle group by sea given its high value in support of our foreign policy.

Force Transportation

Discussion

To transport the ground force to an unfriendly trouble spot in a timely fashion using airlift alone would call for a considerable addition to the tactical airlift fleet, and the introduction of strategic airlift assets.

A sealift capability is a more robust option than airlift alone to move the bulk of a ground force to likely offshore operational locations. Among the appropriate sealift options, the most practicable are ships designed for expeditionary or amphibious operations and possessing the capacities to move the force in its entirety. Among other features, amphibious ships provide a secure base for generating local air superiority and local air mobility assets.

Deductions

Airlift or air delivery alone, either rented or acquired as assets, will not suffice for the task.

Sealift ships with naval infrastructure are needed.

Preservation and enhancement of embarkation facilities on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts is mandatory.

There is a need for a modest strategic airlift capability and an updated and increased tactical airlift.

Time

Discussion

Timeliness is critical, but so is getting the force into operations with minimum losses, maximum effectiveness.

Deductions

The deployment of the expeditionary force will be by a mix of airlift and sealift. The mix will be dependant on the mission, the terrain and the geographic location of the operation. The heavy lift items of the expeditionary force will be primarily delivered by sealift.

The most time efficient and operationally effective mode of transport is dedicated sealift, with airlift/air delivery complimenting the transportation of the ground force.

Force Training

Discussion

Training for such a force is based on the fundamental principle of “train as you will fight.” Thus the Expeditionary Force must develop joint training objectives that culminate in joint exercises and deployments.

Deduction

The Expeditionary Force must train, as it will fight.

Current Assets for the Force

Discussion

At present the Army can provide an appropriate Infantry battalion with suitable support elements added.

The Air Force can provide very limited tactical airlift with Hercules (suitable to support a larger sealift effort), and control of air can be delivered with CF-18’s with the proviso that tankers and forward aerodrome facilities are available. However, unless these facilities can be assured, the use of CF-18’s for this force is problematical.

The Navy cannot now provide an appropriate ship, or ships to transport troops of the ground force with its associated air support, equipment and stores.

Deductions

While a suitable ground force is available, neither the Air Force nor the Navy has adequate assets that can be deployed to satisfy the aim. Currently the army lacks combat arms soldiers to maintain a sustainable expeditionary capability. Further, the acquisition of specialized sealift resources will require additional sailors.

The Navy requires appropriate ships for the transport of the ground force, and in the absence of tankers and forward aerodrome facilities, the Air Force also needs an air defence/ground attack capability.

The Air Force requires an upgrade and increase to its strategic and tactical airlift fleet, to its heli-lift fleet, and its capability to deliver air cover and close air support for the force.

Assets Required for the Force

Discussion

Needed for the force is a type of ship that can transport the proposed ground force. The possible use of naval assets for command and control must be part of the expeditionary package.

A strategic airlift capability is needed, as is an upgrade to present tactical airlift. Contingent and co-located air assets for close air support and local control of the air are required.

Deductions

While appropriate ships to satisfy the aim are not in the Navy’s inventory, the USN, as well as other navies have suitable ships now serving and in production for their Marine Expeditionary fleets.

There is a need within the expeditionary force for Air Force air defence/close air support aircraft. Additional helicopter lift than currently exists in the CF inventory, is also required.

There is a requirement to upgrade airlift resources i.e. replace and increase tactical airlift and to address the need for some level of a strategic airlift

Summary of deductions

While it is necessary for the force to always train for high level combat, the bulk of the defined range of operations may, in the main, be to contribute to “stabilization” tasking(s) as well as tasks that have come to be known as “peace-keeping”, internal disaster relief, aid to civil power and sovereignty. To cope with belligerent forces in the area to be stabilized calls for a balanced force structured around a core of infantry.

The expeditionary force must have achieved an advanced level of training together as a joint force.

For transporting the force, airlift alone (either rented or acquired) will not meet all requirements. The expeditionary force will require a mix of airlift and sealift as well as, enhancement of embarkation facilities on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts.

Finally, a force development plan that provides for adequate and appropriate manning and training for a force designed for expeditionary missions is required – summarized as follows:

Command Element - Serves as headquarters for the entire force and allows a single command to exercise control over all ground, aviation, and combat service support forces.

Ground Combat Element - Provides the force with its main combat punch: an infantry battalion reinforced with armour, artillery, amphibious vehicles, engineers, and reconnaissance assets. The expeditionary force must be capable of dealing with a worst-case scenario and being augmented and sustained by additional or follow on forces.

Aviation Combat Element - This consists of a medium helicopters, air defence and ground attack aircraft –fixed or rotary wing, with ground support assets.

Service Support Group - Provides mission-essential support such as medical/dental assistance, logistics, supply, and maintenance.

Conclusion

Required to meet the aim:

Acquisition of a sealift capability with improvement of embarkation facilities; and

A dedicated infantry battalion battle group; and

Acquisition of upgraded and additional strategic and tactical air transport as well as air control assets; and,

Creation and development of a dedicated joint expeditionary force.

Attenuating Adverse Influences

There are two preconditions to success; these must be severely attenuated else the force will not be formed.

The first is loosening the influence of the procurement process upon the achievement of the aim. It will be important to curtail the influence of the procurement system upon strategic and tactical requirements or changes to the assets needed by the force.

Second, is the attenuation of the inter-service rivalry that prevails within NDHQ.

CODA

The BOFIB – Sea Horse Rapid Reaction Force would restore the capability our Forces require to resume punching above their weight in serving the cause of peace, freedom and humanity around the globe. That in turn will give Canada the military credibility needed to exercise diplomatic muscle in meeting the challenges of the 21^st century, just as we did in previous generations.

MGen (Ret) Lewis MacKenzie served 36 years in the Canadian Army and CF, including nine years in Germany with NATO and nine peacekeeping tours.
Dr. Richard Gimblett’s 27 years in the Navy included Gulf War service and strategic analysis; he is a Research Fellow with Dalhousie Center for Foreign Policy Studies.
Comd (Ret) Ralph Fisher served 28 years in the Navy in operations, development and testing of naval ships and aircraft, including duty with the navies of Britain and the United States.
Col (Ret) John Eggenberger served 10 years in the Militia infantry and 25 years Regular (fighter navigator), retiring as Chief Military Psychologist for the CF.

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