The Army’s impending change and Petronius

It is the job of the Officers to make sense out of nonsense,
and it is the job of the NCOs to create order out of disorder.
— RSM, Canadian School of Infantry

By Col (Ret) John C. Eggenberger

It has been argued elsewhere that “...A successful Army accommodates and manages change, and they do this by retaining the fundamentals for success in combat while integrating appropriate changes called for by new technology or other imperatives.” Yet to be fully understood are the varieties of impacts upon Army fundamentals that may occur as a result of the impending “transformation,” necessary as is thought by the impact of RMA (revolution in military affairs) – or, lack of resources. Petronius in his below cited quote sets the stage for asking several relevant questions.

“We trained hard, but it seemed that every time we were beginning to form up into teams, we would be re-organized. I was to learn later in life that we tend to meet any new situation by reorganizing; and wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency and demoralization.”
— Petronius Arbiter 66BC

Whether or not Petronius really wrote it first is of no consequence – now the phrase has a life all its own. And, experienced military leaders avoid unnecessary re-organization, knowing full well that if not done properly, confusion, inefficiency, and demoralization reign.

Concern here are impending Army organizational changes, based upon RMA /Transformation thinking - or lack of resources, that has raised eyebrows here and there. This concern is real, in the main, because the necessity for this re-organization is still unclear to many.

The emergence of new battlefield units called Battle Groups, seem derived from RMA thinking, but more likely a result of “not enough resources.” These new entities, sometimes called the “plug and play” - or “modular” formations designed to carry the offensive to the enemy, are the present case in point. Are these new Battle Groups more effective than current formations? Or, are these new unit formations simply an “...illusion of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency, and demoralization.”

Organizing and re-organizing is nothing new for the Army. No other organization is obliged to “re-organize” more. The phenomenon is a fundamental part of Army operations. Part of the daily existence of an Army unit is to “get/keep it’s act together.”

For example, after an infantry attack/defence, there is consolidation and “re-org.” Losses are counted and the platoon leaders (Officer/NCOs) re-organize who does what, when and where. The platoon recognizes the need for this re-org; it is obvious – and thus confusion, inefficiency, and demoralization are minimal. These same phenomena occur after attack/defence at company, battalion, Brigade levels, and so on. The possible counter-attack that looms after these actions is a real and powerful motivator. This sort of re-org is part of training and practiced often.

So, re-org is part of Army practice, and if caused by A) casualties or B) acknowledged resource shortfalls or C) operational imperatives, which are natural events, then such re-org is seen by all to be needed, and welcomed.

When the need is not readily apparent for re-organization, as in the recently announced re-organization of the Army’s fighting formations, then “squinty eyes and wrinkled faces” are everywhere evident. What needs to be determined is whether this re-org is true progress or is it simply an illusion of progressive operational effectiveness/efficiency.

Thus the key nugget in the quote: “...and a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress...” is the focus here.

Sometimes re-org is caused by forces other than operational imperatives, such as “new thinking” or, loose cannon visionaries or, unacknowledged resource shortfalls. Separately these issues may be absorbed. Should they happen together, then the re-org will cause significant additional/new/different training – new and different personal relationships, and new and different operating procedures. Certainly they will adversely impact upon unit cohesion, and trust between and within teams.

Unnecessary re-organizations are often caused by a failure to foresee the consequences of re-org relative to such as enemy and threats. Seemingly these proponents of change fail to ask key questions, or pursue answers to issues such as: “Why is the re-org necessary? Why cannot existing formations do these new roles? How does the re-org affect the efficiencies of existing formations? What are the longer-term consequences of these changes on troops, and so on?”

It is argued that the formation, training and deployment of Army forces into the new “Battle Group” will deliver more “bang for the buck” than current formations. Perhaps, but if the Battle Groups are formed at the expense of present brigades, those brigades will disappear. With this refocus, the Army capability to concentrate timely critical combat power on the battlefield will be lost.

The notion of the modular army may have merit, but before actually generating these changes, it would be prudent to answer three critical questions.

First, how have the last 10 to 15 years of operational experience influenced the convictions of the present leadership cadre? This experience has typically seen a “force” temporarily organized around an under-strength infantry unit, some armour, some artillery manning the infantry mortars, some engineers as the infantry pioneer platoon (maybe) and some Service Battalion sections, along with some reservists filling in the blank files. These stopgap efforts merely reflect both manpower and equipment shortages brought about by a parsimonious government that fails to comprehend the realities of warfighting. Put together for a limited duration, deployed – then returned, and another formation similarly formed and deployed – etc. etc. And, considerable political success has been posited through this routine.

Is this routine improvisation practiced over the past decade the wave of the future? Or, are these years of experience simply an anomaly soon to pass, or indeed is it a new (and perhaps additional) aspect of arranging forces for battle. More to the point, is it that these new task groups will no longer need force-generating units from which to reconstitute?

Second, to what extent will the formation of these battle groups diminish the proven effectiveness of current formations to deliver combat power?

If these new Battle Groups are to become more permanent, then certain outcomes are predictable. An inevitable outcome is that these new Battle Groups will generate a new ethos, they will want a “flag,” a “badge” – and emerging will be all the appurtenances needed to produce a cohesive unit, and there is not a lot wrong with doing this. In fact one would suppose that so to do would be in the natural order of things.

The larger danger in this outcome lies in the evil of scarce resources and in the fullness of time, it may be thought unnecessary to support two sorts of fighting formations – the Battle Group, and the current Regiments. To save money, it may be that the current Regiments, being seen as unnecessary, could be stood down – and these new units in their stead become stand-alone entities. No longer could the Canadian Army deploy forces other than in Battle Groups, and this unit might not serve us well in future.

And then there is the Militia as one foundation for the mobilization of the nation’s Army. This concept could be at odds with the structure of the emerging Battle Groups, and it is difficult to foresee a smooth transition to Battle Groups for these Militia formations.

Third question. By what means will the comparative combat power effectiveness of each organization be measured? Needed here is simply an operational research design that will attend to the issues raised in the first two questions.

For example, the new so-called task oriented “battle groups” seem based on the assumption that the old structure lacked flexibility. Yet historically, the regimental system from Roman to colonial times, and lately two World Wars and Korea, has proved itself adaptable and flexible in handling a great variety of tasks – from hard fighting, imposing order (peace), to policing or building national infrastructure to providing stability for new indigenous governments. 

Moreover, the Regimental structure has adapted to new weaponry and other technological advances with appropriate changes to its own organization, tactics and SOPs.  It is equally capable of making appropriate use of the much vaunted new information technology and weapons of increased precision. The RMA/Transformation folk have NOT made their case that the old system won't work in yet another new or different setting. No empirical evidence has been presented to buttress one case, or refute another.

The proponents of RMA/Transformation have not yet supplied empirical information on whether the outcomes called for by new technology have been identified, nor what it is that needs to be changed within the present configuration to achieve these outcomes. Nevertheless, change is now planned for (but not altogether bought into) and the plan is ready for execution. But nowhere to be found in the plan is accommodation for the retention of Army fundamentals. Is it that these have been abandoned? If so – then what are the new sets of “fundamentals” upon which the Army will be devised? _

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