The Death of an Air Force: RMA—Transformation or Misguided Leadership?

By Col (Ret) John C. Eggenberger

When a dispassionate examination is made of the changes to the configuration of the Air Force over the past several years, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that our Air Force is nearly dead as a fighting force. And, if recovery action is not soon taken, will die altogether. The main cause for this dreadful state of affairs is directly related to decisions made by earlier Air Force leadership that are based upon the conviction that the Air Force is a business, like any other.

Coupled with this danger for the Air Force, are late coming, well-meaning proponents of RMA (revolution in military affairs)/Transformation. These folk adopt the business model to argue that to effect change, it is no longer necessary to expend the effort to generate the conditions to build effective teams. They also argue that in these days of apparent rapid change, there is no need to retain old Air Force ethos – indeed these old notions are seen as impediments to effective change.

But change is a fact of life, and the management of change is never easy; change hurts, change is frustrating – especially for those that propose and fight for change. Sometimes for the proponents of change, the situation becomes so frustrating that "revolutions" are set in motion. And all revolutions have unexpected consequences. It may well be that the proponents of RMA/Transformation have moved along so rapidly as to cause damage to the fundamentals of Air Force combat capability, which is the opposite of what the RMA folks intend.

At its core, a successful Air Force is a team in which bonds are forged based on competency and trust between the members themselves and with their team leaders. These bonds, so vital to success are derived through its training regimen, its ethos, and values, including traditions and standards of behaviour. And these teams include not only the "flyers," but also the personnel associated with the maintenance of aircraft.

As argued elsewhere, these fundamental characteristics need to be the sounding board against which changes can be validated. The result of this sounding should act so as to prevent the introduction of damaging changes, which diminish the strength of these bonds, thus the combat capability of the Air Force. Once undermined, the ethos, values and traditions, which the Air Force needs as pre-requisites for success in controlling the air, are difficult to regain.

RMA/Transformation proponents have accepted earlier Air Force decisions, e.g., that the Air Force is like a commercial "business," and that it is therefore sensible to design it to make a profit. It follows from that train of logic that it is also sensible for the Air Force to "contract out," as does business. It is within the phenomena of "contracting out" that resides the main disease that is killing the bonds upon which Air Force success depends. But it is impossible for the Air Force to make a profit, and thus it is illogical to base its operational philosophy upon business models. The purpose of the Air Force is to control the air, and it must be designed to apply lethal force to win armed conflicts in the air, wherever assigned.

In consequence of using a business model for the design of the Air Force, no longer does the Air Force altogether train its own, and no longer does aircraft maintenance respond to the command of the Air Force squadron. This is most evident in Portage La Prairie and Moose Jaw where the Air Force is in a business partnership with Bombardier to train pilots. At Portage La Prairie, Bombardier provides the aircraft, flying instructors, maintenance personnel, ground school instructors, simulators and instructors for the ground training. At Moose Jaw and Cold Lake the aircraft and maintenance are provided by Bombardier, and the Air Force supplies the flying instruction.

With these critical organizational elements contracted out, the budding Air Force pilot does not get early and consistent opportunity for systematic "follower/leader" experiences in a fully developed organization that can control the air – anywhere, anytime. Nor in current circumstance do qualified pilots get the experience necessary to command a fully functional and deployable squadron capable of controlling air. In consequence, Air Force leadership is always deficient of the holistic experience of commanding squadrons in deployed operations. Thus, the bonds of mutual trust and competence within a deployable squadron, vital to the delivery of lethal force for control of the air, cannot be developed.

Further, consistent with business fundamentals, the Air Force has sought contracts, and has done so by acquiring "contracts" to supply helicopter-flying operations for the Army and the Navy. In business, the contractor can at whim change suppliers and it is clear that Air Force leadership have not considered the effect upon the Air Force should this event occur.

However, no business corporation obliges its "employees" to put themselves in harm’s way where death might be the outcome. Nor do they oblige their employees to deliver lethal force upon command. These two factors more than any other, militate against using the business model to configure the ethos for a fighting force. As an aside, when a business goes broke, it simply folds – its employees go home and get another job. The Air Force does not have that liberty or right. The RMA/Transformation folk do not seem to understand this fundamental fact.

Recovery for the Air Force calls for taking bad tasting medicine. First is needed the decision to return to the core responsibility of the Air Force, the control of the air. At the same time a decision must be taken to return to the Army and the Navy that which is theirs – helicopter operations that are integral to their mission. This mission is of little or no consequence to the central purpose of the Air Force, but now drains off and diverts at least fifty percent of Air Force resources from its core responsibility, control of the air.

More importantly, decisions must be taken to reduce the influence of the business model and "contracting out" upon the organizational structure of the Air Force.

In sum, of first priority for the air Force is control of the air and to do so calls for squadron organizational reconfiguration that includes pilots, aircraft and as well maintenance facilities and personnel. Then needed is the dedication of assets and adequate training for these squadrons; thence the development of similarly configured squadrons that can supply close air support to the army, and of equal priority is the formation of heavy lift transport, surveillance and search and rescue squadrons.

Also critical to recovery is a thorough re-think of the ways the Air Force has decided to manage change. The consequences of not doing so are far reaching. Continuing down the present pathway will not result in an Air Force that has the capability and competence to control air. Thus, there will be little chance that Canada can participate in any meaningful way in joint operations with our neighbors to the south, or allies elsewhere – because our Air Force will not be taken seriously. Without substance, neither will the Air Force be welcome as partners should opportunities arise to undertake responsibility for certain segments necessary for control of the air over North America. Nor will the Air Force be taken seriously should there be a wish to contribute to a North American missile defence system, because the Air Force will not be seen as having the fundamentals in place.

Needed is an Air Force with capability and competence to sit and break bread as partners in these circumstances, and right now that scenario is problematical. And the fault for this dreadful situation resides as much in the leadership of the Air Force, as it does in our Government’s inattention. _

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