Future roles for the Canadian Forces?

By BGen (Ret) Lloyd Skaalen

The federal government over the past three decades has under funded and vacillated on the roles for the Canadian Forces to the extent that we no longer have the capability to do anything very well, certainly not to the standards that earned us kudos in the 50s and 60s. Perhaps it is time for a new government, or at least political party platforms, to propose and then introduce new objectives for the foreign and domestic roles of Canada's "Armed" Forces.

Gone are the days when every small country in terms of population and economic base, can exercise, or needs to be capable of exercising, military force in all roles for independent purposes. Such countries, Canada included, must instead forge relationships with other nations for national defence, mutual deterrence and for the promotion of international stability. The UK Minister of Defence, Geoff Hoon, noted this in his 26 June statement: "It is highly unlikely that the United Kingdom would be engaged in large-scale combat operations without the United States …"

To some degree, Canada's defence policy of 2003 acknowledges our interdependence with allies in that, after the primary objective of defending Canada, it identifies the other principal objectives as "contribute to the defence of North America, in co-operation with the US," and "contribute to international peace and security."

But why does the first objective, defence of Canada, suggest that we can do it alone?

We still vainly attempt to field forces that are independent of others, even of our own Coast Guard in national defence, and to equip for traditional Cold War and ‘total war’ international conflicts. It is time for a reality adjustment in Canadian foreign and defence policy.

The defence of Canada, for other than an attack by US forces, must recognize our reliance on our powerful neighbour, the United States. From weather surveillance and analysis to space based systems for navigation, we are now integrated and mutually dependent. Let us then proceed with more integration of our military and para-military forces. It is especially urgent that naval and coast guard resources be interoperable for the security of coastal areas and ports of North America. However, there are similar operational partnerships that must be developed between our regular army and militia forces in the manner already achieved by our air and space forces within NORAD and Space Command. Northern Command is a new step in that direction.

As for a Canadian capability to ‘contribute to’ international peace and security, we must note the conclusion of a 20 June 2003 article in the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, "Toward a Global Cavalry" by Thomas Donnelly and Vance Serchuk: "...the strategic imperative of patrolling the perimeter of the Pax Americana is transforming the US military, and those few other forces capable and willing of standing alongside, into the cavalry of a global, liberal international order. …their job is one part warrior and one part policeman …" (www.aei.org/publications/ )

If not ‘embedded’ within the US order of battle for these international roles, we must be prepared to ‘contribute’ similarly under the banner of NATO, the UN, or even of EUCOM. That means Canadian units, over and above those needed for North American defence, manned, trained and equipped for rapid deployment to every potential trouble spot in the world. That challenge may lead to a rationalization of what it is that we could contribute.

In my view, our future focus for international contributions should be just one or two support functions that will be useful in virtually every scenario.

Chris Bullock argues, in the Spring/Summer issue of the CMSS Journal, that Canada could contribute to its national and North American defence by equipping a sea based ballistic missile defence (BMD) capability, and, at the same time, by making it available for deployment with US or (my assumption) multi-national task forces. ( www.jmss.org )

Nic Boisvert argues, in his 7 July 03 paper to CCS 21, that it may be time for the renaissance of the aircraft carrier and its multi-support capability in deployed operations for multi-national ‘force projection’ objectives. Of course, he reminds all of the essential pre-requisites of interoperability. (www.ccs21.org and select ‘articles’)

I would suggest that our Canadian Forces become experts in and training of other forces in the operation and management of drones and other remotely controlled systems that have proven so valuable in Afghanistan and Iraq. We have seen them used for traditional ground and underwater surveillance, for direct pre-programmed attack, for air to ground support (e.g. Predator), for defence of installations (e.g. Patriot), and for the interception of enemy aircraft and of surface ships.

We have had experience in this field (with Bomarc, ADATS, CL289, etc.) and, we certainly have current expertise in the command and control systems that are associated, such as from AWACS and within NORAD ground and space control facilities.

With this range of employment in all conflict scenarios, unmanned vehicles (UVs) could be the most important assets for the prevention of manned combat or prosecution of combat operations with the minimum exposure of high value resources such as manpower, ships, submarines and aircraft.

Of course there are other more traditional contributions that could be made by Canada toward the objective of international security, such as EW/ECM expertise, air transport support or field hospital teams. And, in every option we must remember the absolute necessity for manpower on the ground to consolidate peacemaking or peacekeeping roles that may have been made possible by the ‘projection of force’ modes previously described. So, mobile land forces, trained for foreign multi-national assignments, must be maintained by Canada; and, that formation (battalion or brigade) must be surplus to national defence requirements.

But, how can the Canadian Forces contemplate new roles and expensive capital equipment? Perhaps by giving up some of the activities that have been by-passed by technology. Just as the archers were made redundant by artillery and rockets, perhaps fighter aircraft and manned aerial combat have now to make way for other means of attaining air superiority, such as unmanned systems.

Likewise, the effectiveness of manned submarines and armoured tanks should be questioned for the roles now postulated for national defence and international mobility operations.

Do we need our very own long-range air and sea transport, if we are going to be operating at all times with allies? Why not contribute to a multi-national capability as we are doing today for NATO AWACS?

These are hard questions, but they must be asked!

Now, let us find the political leadership that will establish a forthright foreign policy role for Canada in the next decade. With clarity in that objective and with proper funding, we will have the capability to implement the military force structure and equipment most suited to our future national and international obligations. _

BGen Lloyd Skaalen is a RUSI of VI member and former director.

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