Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island crest RUSI-VI
Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island

Newsletter Vol 35, no. 3 - Third Quarter 2003

“The New North Strong and Free”

A Canadian Alliance Defence Vision

By LCdr (Ret) Murray Watkin

The Canadian Alliance issued its defence policy paper this past spring. It makes 33 recommendations for improving the capability of the Canadian Forces.

Its recommendations call for an immediate annual increase to the defence budget base of $2 billion; an increase over time to 80,000 personnel in the Regular Force and 60,000 in the Reserves of which 45,000 would be for the Militia; measures to improve esprit de corps and morale, including restoration of the distinct identities of the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force; a rational meaningful rank structure; separate civilian and military components of National Defence Headquarters and a reduction in unnecessary bureaucracy; and a much greater role for Parliament in overseeing the development and employment of the Canadian Forces.

It also discusses internal security, defence of North America in concert with the USA, the war on terror, and the ability of the Canadian Forces to participate in a meaningful way with our allies overseas.

This is just a brief overview of what seems a well thought out set of recommendations to offer to our Federal Government, BUT!! Of concern is that, like Canadian defence policy for the past decade or more, it lacks a much-needed foundation from which to formulate a rational defence policy, force structure and their financial requirements.

We need a coherent National Security Strategy. By its nature, such a strategy would involve far more than the size, structure and capability of the Canadian Forces. In this context, our vital interests and important interests at home and abroad would have to be determined. From that would flow our foreign policy, the duties and responsibilities, equipment, structure and size of the Canadian Forces, the RCMP, security and intelligence services, the Coast Guard, and emergency preparedness organizations; and our shared responsibilities with allies, to name but a few.

Within Canada, there is the need to examine the security of our transportation systems such as highways, electricity transmission, pipelines, harbours, sea-lanes, our airspace and airports. In brief, what is our critical infrastructure? Moreover, what protection is needed for vital points such as legislatures, communications centres, hydroelectric generation facilities such as dams and nuclear reactors?

Obviously, the following items are unlikely to be mentioned in minute detail in a national security strategy or a defence policy white paper, but because of their size and importance, they need to be considered in the overall plan.

The Regular Force. The units and formations mentioned in the Canadian Alliance Vision consist of front line units and, by extension, their integral first and second echelon combat support and combat service support organizations. Their policy talks about providing heavy lift for the deployment of forces. But except for the heavy lift capability, the sustainment of front line units via third and fourth echelon support is not specifically addressed.

Some of the things that come to mind are deployed storage facilities for ammunition, fuel and lubricants, equipment repair and replacement capabilities, supply storage facilities, in-theatre hospital facilities and strategic casualty evacuation and their staffing.

Unless we are going to be involved in purely low intensity operations, these, to name a few, along with their necessary ground and air defence requirements, need to be considered in the development of defence policy. How much of this can be shared, both ways, with allies?

The Reserve Force. With the exception of the Naval Reserve, which crews 12 Kingston class maritime coastal defence vessels (MCDV), few if any, of the reserve units are combat ready either in equipment or people. Nor do any of the units appear to have a clearly defined role. Some units, such as the militia medical units, have no defined place in current doctrine, unless there have been recent changes of which this writer is unaware. This also should be considered in a national security strategy and included in defence policy.

Some of the tasks that could be assigned to the reserve forces include the provision of vital point protection in Canada, the creation of third echelon units to support deployed forces in the field, in deployed dockyards and deployed airfields and to provide the ground and air defence security for those facilities. Again, the participation with allies, both ways, should be considered.

Another possible task for the militia is the provision of a third or fourth combat unit, infantry or armour, to existing regular force brigade groups or even the creation of a fully formed militia brigade group. Consideration ought to be given to employment of supplementary reservists at all levels but especially in third and fourth echelon units.

The Army may wish to use a program like the Naval Reserve’s MCDVs in which the Navy has effectively increased its working navy without increasing the size of the regular force. About 95 per cent of the MCDV crews are Class B call-outs from the Naval Reserve Divisions, including the captains.

“The True North Strong and Free” is available online at www.canadianalliance.ca under publications - defence.

LCdr Watkin served as a medical assistant in the RCN and as a Health Care Administrator in the Canadian Forces Medical Services and is a member of RUSI of VI.