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Newsletter Vol 34, no. 1 - First Quarter 2002
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The Way Ahead
A National Security Strategy
by Cmdre (Ret) T.C. Heath and LCol (Ret) J.C. Berezowski


After years of defence cut backs in Canada, it should be clear to even the most passionate of pacifists that our national security and defence are at a cross-road. In reality our armed forces cannot do more with less. Not any more after years of benevolent budgetary neglect, administered by governments seemingly more interested in re-election and placation of special interest than the security or long-term future of our nation within the world community.

Despite great anticipation. Budget 2001 has given the Canadian Forces little more than what had already been earmarked earlier or than necessary to sustain our limited participation in operations of the United States-led coalition against terrorism. For regardless of the words of our government, our participation is limited and more for political show than military meaningfulness. Indeed, the government's budget merely gave credence to the scathing commentary of the Auditor General of Canada, Sheila Fraser, in her first report to parliament last month.

Ms. Fraser cast serious doubt on assertions by the defence minister that the Armed Forces are more capable of combat than they were 10 years ago. "The department has frequently said that the Canadian Forces have never been more capable," Ms Fraser said. "But until steps are taken to manage equipment readiness more adequately, these claims should be taken with a grain of salt." Yes, we may have more combat capability in certain areas for our ships as an example, or in specific areas of ground operations, but is there the wherewithal to sustain that combat effectiveness into the future or extended periods of operations? It is this area that the Auditor General's report should channel our questions.

The assumption by policy makers that the current or projected risks to our nation do not demand a higher state of readiness or the ability to deploy meaningful force levels to aid our friends and allies, is faulty to say the least. An additional $500 million annually to Defence for the next two years for Operation Apollo and some capital procurement does little to help the current crisis. In-deed, the Auditor General asserted that the immediate need was at least $1.3 billion for this year and more billions for the next five. The additional funding levels for JTF2 is welcome but is it enough? Do we need even more emphasis upon Special Forces for the future?

The bulk of the $7.7 billion for security is allocated to improving domestic security and intelligence in response to quiet American pressure. Securing the perimeter of North America, expediting border crossings and customs, policing, fixing Canada's porous immigration and refugee processes were more worrisome than defence. The Americans have not pressed hard on Canadian defence, knowing the huge costs of military modernization. Our allies know that we spend only $265 per capita on defence while the NATO average is $589. Will Canada only find out that our de-fence investments have been too limited when we experience some tragedy in the future? Will we continue to take calculated risks sending our sons and daughters into harm's way knowingly ill equipped, just to maintain an inter-national image for sake of the political leadership? Will the price of learning be in the return of body bags?

A more urgent need now is a synthesis of foreign policy, defence and security policy. There is the great question of what do we as a nation want defence to do? With-out a definitive answer there is little long-term management that will occur as we continue just lurching along.

While our country is in for a difficult time financially, are we getting the best out of current in-vestment? Is the investment directed towards a long-term goal? What are Canada's objectives in the world? There is a need to revisit the defence white paper of 1994/5, which was directed at a post-cold war world much more benign than has come to pass. Last February our Federation (FMUSIC) recommended to government that a blue-ribbon panel of experts be chartered to quickly craft a national security strategy for the 21st century. The panel must represent different political viewpoints and varied kinds of political and academic experience. Its mandate would be to find maxi-mum, feasible convergence on is-sues of paramount importance to the security of Canada. This strategy would guide and coordinate our future foreign, defence and economic policies, their plans, pro-grams and resources for the next 10 to 15 years. This panel would report to Parliament. The problem is that governments think in terms of elections and not long-term trends or requirements.

Other countries have been more insightful. The British, for example, had a rapid reaction plan for their military to respond in a crisis. Now because of 9/11, they are upgrading those foreign policy, defence and security plans. Their approach is instructive. Following the appalling events of 11 September, Britain's Defence Minister, Geoffrey Hoon, commissioned work to ensure that Britain's Armed Forces are able to deal with such threats. The work undertaken is intended to ensure that Britain has the right defence concepts, capabilities and forces to deal with threats of this kind and of this scale. It will look hard at plans and programs so that they add capability where it counts - where it makes a difference.

Like their Strategic Defence Review three years ago, they will draw on the extensive pool of knowledge within the United Kingdom - from other government departments, academics and other experts, parliamentarians, and, of course, the public. And they also want to discuss the work with Al-lies.

However, the attacks on the United States on 11 September have shown that they must build on their previous efforts. They must ensure that they continue to adjust the de-fence posture and capabilities to meet the possible demands of the future. We in Canada also need to review our efforts and potential responses. The areas that we need to re-examine parallel those of the British study, namely:

1. How Much Has Changed? The first task is to stop and assess if 11 September represented a fundamental change in the strategic context and, if so, how serious a change? One of the key tasks of Government is to place these events into some perspective.

2. Dealing With Symptoms And Causes. The second task is to en-sure that the examination attempts to understand the causes of terrorism and, where and why asymmetric threats might emerge

3. Threats And Vulnerabilities. As the third task, the work must consider the extent to which one can continue to rely on specific intelligence of threats. Should one now be thinking more in terms of risk and vulnerabilities and how to manage these?

4. Overseas Operations. The fourth task is to strike the right balance between the contributions the Armed Forces make to home-land defence and response to challenges abroad. The nature of these external missions must also be examined.

If we are serious concerning the human rights of others then we must consider the potential options of intervention. These are not just limited to humanitarian aid or peacekeeping. If we are really interested in the plight of others, they also include the potential use of limited force. For example, a deployable capability and collective international political will would have gone a long way in preventing or limiting the genocide in Rwanda. Response to human security in a violent world will some times take more than good intentions and political speeches.

5. Internal Security. The fifth task is to consider the role of the Armed Forces at home. Are the Forces the prime emergency response mechanism, or is it rightly the role of civil agencies taking the lead with the Forces assisting.

6. The Reserves. Can the reserves structure continue as now? Should the reserves not be capable of rapid integration into meaningful and deployable force structures at short notice? Future requirements for the military will most probably not include time for mobilization and lengthy pre-deployment training. Future and indeed current response requirements are "come as you are affairs" and may emerge with short notice. If we are going to participate then we must be ready to do so on a permanent basis. This entails restructuring of the reserve concepts, but also proper equipment and training. It also includes that the government provide the necessary legal protection for jobs for members of the reserves.

7. International Organizations And Regional Relationships. The final task is to examine how regional and bilateral relationships have been affected by 11 September, and to understand how international organizations, including the United Nations, NATO and the European Union should be operating in the new environment. (Question: What should Canada's place be in these organizations? Membership should be more than the nation's name on a placard at the table. Rights and privileges of membership also come with obligations. Forces and capabilities ear-marked for these organizations need to represent more then the numerical "shell game" that is conducted at present.)

Canada's shortfalls in the current reality are many: there is limited strategic lift capability for the air force, limited numerical strength for the army, no maritime helicopter contract. Our ability to maintain significant forces on high readiness is curtailed by limited operational funding. We seldom train at the force levels that we claim. When was the last full and protracted Brigade-level exercise for the Army for example? Without these investments capabilities erode away. The crisis is now; further erosion brings into question any investment at all.

None of us is seeking a large military capability at the cost of social programs or other essential frameworks of our society; just a level of credibility both within the nation and without. It should not be the case of either/or in the world's ninth largest economy. The Forces are a seriously ill patient, just like medicare but without the high public profile and without champions in the body politic or the press. It is now up to those interested, those who place value on the total frame-work of the nation-state called Canada, to invest their time and energy and their support.

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